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SUMMARY 
 
 This dissertation examines the role of public investments in inducing small firms 
to develop risky, early-stage technologies.  It contributes to expanding our understanding 
of the consequences of research, innovation, and entrepreneurship policies and programs 
by investigating in more depth the effect of the Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) program on the innovation effort, ability to attract external capital, and other 
metrics of post-entry performance of small business start-ups using a new sample and 
estimation approach.   
Unlike prior R&D subsidy studies that concentrated almost exclusively on 
European countries, this dissertation focused on small business start-ups in the United 
States using a new scientific survey of new firms.  It integrated the Kauffman Firm 
Survey (KFS) from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation with the SBIR recipient 
dataset from the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and used advances in 
statistical matching to achieve better comparability between the treated and control 
groups of small business start-ups.  The integrated KFS-SBA dataset, which contains 
both recipient and non-recipient small firms, and statistical matching allowed us to 
empirically construct the counterfactual outcomes of SBIR recipients.   
This dissertation balanced the pre-treatment characteristics of SBIR recipients 
and non-recipients through propensity score matching (PSM).  It constructed the 
comparison sample by identifying non-recipients with nearly identical propensity scores 
as those of SBIR recipients.  Consistent with the propensity score theorem, observations 
with the same distribution of propensity scores have the same distribution of observable 
 xii 
characteristics.  PSM made the comparison and treatment samples homogenous except in 
SBIR program exposure, making the fundamental assumption of ignorability of treatment 
assignment more plausible.   
Using the realized outcomes of observationally similar non-recipient start-ups as 
the counterfactual outcomes of SBIR recipients, we found empirical evidence of the input 
additionality effect of the SBIR program.  Had they not applied for and granted SBIR 
R&D subsidies, recipient start-ups would have spent only $185,000 in R&D, but with 
SBIR their R&D effort was significantly increased to $663,000, on average.  The 
treatment effects analyses also found a significant positive effect of SBIR on innovation 
propensity and employment.  However, it appears that public co-financing of commercial 
R&D has crowded-out privately financed R&D of small business start-ups in the United 
States.  A dollar of SBIR subsidy decreased firm-financed R&D by about $0.16.   
Contrary to prior SBIR studies, we did not find any significant “halo effect” or 
“certification effect” of receiving an SBIR award on attracting external capital.  However, 
we discovered a different certification effect of the SBIR program:  SBIR grantees are 
more likely to attract external patents.  This finding also confirms that innovation requires 
a portfolio of internal and external knowledge assets as theorized by David Teece and his 
colleagues.             
This dissertation’s empirical results may be relevant to the Small Business 
Administration, SBIR participating agencies, the U.S. Congress, other federal, state and 
local policymakers, small high-tech start-ups, and scholars in the field of science, 
technology, and innovation policy.            
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
Innovation is the single most important determinant of long-run productivity 
growth and improved standards of living (Abramovitz, 1956; Baumol, 2010; Boskin & 
Lau, 1990; Lerner, 2009; Romer, 1986, 1990; Solow, 1956, 1957; Tassey, 1997).  The 
belief in the value of innovation in economic growth is not mere “technological 
optimism” as Cohen and Noll (1991) put it, drawing at least from the economic success 
of the United States through the 21
st
 century.  The importance of technology-based 
growth, however, does not necessarily provide sufficient incentive for the private market 
to invest in innovation (Arrow, 1962; Lerner, 2009).  Accordingly, the public sector has 
participated in the development of technological innovations by funding basic research
1
, 
sponsoring technology research that supports agency missions
2
 and mandates (e.g. 
national defense, health care, development of efficient energy sources), and increasingly, 
by providing R&D tax credits, encouraging cooperative research arrangements among 
firms, supporting technology transfer from academic to industrial laboratories, and 
cofinancing commercial R&D.
3
 These policy interventions are intended to sustain 
technological change and progress. The strategic importance of continuous technology 
                                                 
 
 
1
 The assumption here is that the pipeline or linear model of innovation (Bush, 1945) is true, i.e., results of 
academic research drive the production of new products and processes in the commercial sector. 
2
 It assumes a spin-off model of innovation, that is, military technologies and other agency mission-oriented 
technologies diffuse to the private sector that will, in turn, develop commercial applications.    
3
 This is not an exhaustive list of research, technology, and innovation policy tools.   
 2 
development and innovation is further highlighted by global competition.  For decades, 
other economies like Japan and South Korea have invested significantly in human and 
physical capital and developed the capability to innovate (not just imitate) in current 
technologies, leading to what Tassey (2007) called “convergence in national 
technological capacity”.  Continuing U.S. technological superiority cannot be assumed.  
It is critical that its national innovation system continuously provide mechanisms to 
encourage the steady production of new technology assets as a foundation for future 
economic growth.           
Small and new enterprises have contributed significantly to the national 
innovation effort.  In the 20
th
 century, half of the most important inventions and 
innovations in the U.S. originated from small businesses or independent inventors 
(Wetzel, 1982 as cited by Van Osnabrugge & Robinson, 2000).
4
  In a more recent study, 
Breitzman and Hicks (2008) found that small businesses are more productive in 
generating patents than their larger counterparts.   A more nuanced conclusion is 
provided by Acs and Audretsch (1990), who showed that small firms contribute to 
innovation more than large firms in a number of industries, such as electronics and 
computing equipment, process control instruments, synthetic rubber, fluid meters and 
counting devices, engineering and scientific instruments, and measuring and controlling 
devices.
5
  Small firms are more innovative than their larger counterparts in specific 
                                                 
 
 
4
 This finding is hardly novel.  As early as 1958, Jewkes and his colleagues documented that major 
innovations were developed outside of large firms. 
5
 Large firms, on the other hand, are more innovative in tires and inner tubes, agricultural chemicals, 
general industrial machinery, food products machinery, ammunition, paper industries machinery, primary 
metal products, among others (Acs & Audretsch, 1990).   
 3 
industries leading to a “division of labor” between small and large firms in innovation.  
This “division of labor” was validated by recent studies; for example, Almeda and Kogut 
(1997) showed that small business start-ups innovate in less crowded technological fields 
while large firms contribute in established or mature fields.  Another important 
contribution of small firms and start-ups is job creation.  Small firms create more new 
jobs than they eliminate.  Birch (1979, 1981), using Duns & Bradstreet (D&B) data, first 
documented that small firms created most new jobs.  While Birch’s study was not 
without critics, his major finding was substantiated and verified by subsequent studies.  
Especially during economic recessions, small and young firms are a net generator of jobs, 
unlike large and established firms, which cut more jobs than they create (Armington, 
Robb & Acs, 1999; Small Business Administration, 2009). 
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is a U.S. federal policy 
intervention that co-finances technology development with small enterprises, i.e., firms 
with less than 500 employees.  This dissertation examines the effectiveness of the SBIR 
in inducing innovation effort among small business start-ups using a new sample and 
methods motivated by the counterfactual approach to causation.   
 
1.2. The Small Business Innovation Research Program 
SBIR is a well-established U.S. federal program.  The U.S. Congress established 
SBIR through the Small Business Act of 1982.  It is a government R&D subsidy program 
to small firms.  By lowering the cost of R&D, SBIR can encourage small firms to 
undertake R&D more intensively.   
 4 
The four goals of the SBIR are (1) to stimulate technological innovation, (2) to 
use small businesses to meet federal research and development needs, (3) to encourage 
participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation, and   
(4) to increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federal 
research and development   (P.L. 97-219).    
SBIR is the largest federal R&D program for small and medium-sized enterprises, 
with funding exceeding $1 billion annually.  Eleven federal agencies participate in the 
SBIR program: Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of 
Defense, Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health and 
Human Services, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, and 
Department of Homeland Security.  The Small Business Innovation Development Act as 
amended mandates these agencies to set aside 2.5 percent of their extramural R&D funds 
to implement SBIR.     
The SBIR grants are awarded in two phases.  Phase I R&D awards grants select 
small firms up to $150,000 for the short-term investigation of the scientific and technical 
merit and feasibility of a research idea.  Phase II awards additional federal funds up to 
$750,000 each to develop Phase 1 research ideas that have strong commercial potential.  
Phase III, for which no SBIR funds are awarded, focuses on private commercialization of 
Phase II projects.   
 
 
 
 5 
1.3. Research Questions 
This dissertation addresses the following research questions: 
1. What are the characteristics of small business start-ups that received SBIR 
program funds?  Do recipient small business start-ups differ significantly 
from non-recipient start-ups?   
2. What are the most important attributes of small business start-ups that 
contribute to successful SBIR application and selection?   
3. Does the SBIR increase the R&D effort and innovation propensities of small 
business start-ups? 
4. Does the SBIR expand the capacity of small business start-ups to attract 
external capital? 
5. Does the SBIR have a positive effect on other metrics of post-entry 
performance of small business start-ups such as sales and employment size? 
 
1.4. Potential Contribution to the Literature and Policy Relevance 
This dissertation examines the role of public investments in inducing small firms 
to develop early-stage technologies.  It improves upon previous studies that investigated 
the effect of SBIR by using a new sample and a new estimation approach.  Most prior 
SBIR studies have only looked at recipient-firms.  Relying on program recipients’ report 
of their pay-off from participating in public programs may result in an upward bias in the 
estimation of the program effect (Storey, 2002).  More importantly, samples that only 
contain recipient firms cannot test the program effect of public financing programs.  
Policy evaluation must always address the counterfactual outcome: what would have 
 6 
happened without the policy intervention?  It thus requires observationally similar cases 
that did not receive the intervention or treatment.
6
  Two SBIR studies (Lerner, 1999; 
Wallsten, 2000) used both recipient- and non-recipient firms, but constructed their 
sample by manually combining recipient and non-recipient firms.  The use of rejected 
firms and firms that may not be eligible to participate in the SBIR program most likely 
did not lead to unit homogeneity between participating and non-participating small firms, 
which is a critical requirement for meaningful comparisons of mean outcomes between 
groups (Gelman & Hill, 2007).  This dissertation can potentially fill up this void by 
building a new dataset of recipient and non-recipient small business start-ups.   
Unlike prior evaluation studies, this study uses an inflow sample of small business 
start-ups.  This inflow sample is a panel study of a cohort of firms that all started business 
operations in 2004.  The main methodological advantage of an inflow sample is that it 
can rule out confounding effects of macroeconomic variables, as all businesses in the 
sample have been exposed to the same external factors.  This inflow sample of start-ups 
is integrated with the SBIR recipient database to identify small high-tech business start-
ups that received public financing from SBIR.  As far as I know, this research is the first 
effort to integrate SBIR recipient data with a new sample of business start-ups.  Thus, the 
resultant dataset is an important addition to the data infrastructure for research, 
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 Treatment is defined broadly in the methodology literature.  It can be a drug or a new therapy 
administered to patients, a training program offered to displaced workers, or an educational innovation 
applied to a set of students.   
 7 
innovation, and entrepreneurship policy studies.
7
  Following Hall (2008) and Jaffe 
(1999), this dissertation attempts to simulate an experimental setting in order to construct 
the counterfactual outcomes of small business start-ups that received public financing.  
The study’s empirical model follows the counterfactual approach to causation.  Treating 
policy and program evaluation as a “missing data” problem, the model uses data from 
observationally similar non-recipient small business start-ups to impute the value of the 
unobserved counterfactual outcomes of new small high-tech firms that received public 
financing.   
While this dissertation’s estimation approach is applied to the evaluation of a 
federal technology program, it has wide applicability to other policy fields.  Its emphasis 
on comparing comparable groups (achieved through statistical matching) and controlling 
for macroeconomic variables (by using an inflow or cohort sample) is relevant to the 
practice of policy and program evaluation, specifically on methods to improve the 
internal validity of treatment effect estimates.   
Only a few evaluation studies have focused on the role of public financing on 
small business start-ups.  The focus of this research is early-stage technology 
development by small business start-ups.  From a Schumpeterian perspective, small 
business start-ups are agents of technical change because of their propensity to introduce 
new products and processes in emerging or less-crowded technological fields.  These new 
technologies can potentially supersede current technologies and in the process, redefine 
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 Subject to the disclosure and confidentiality policies of the Kauffman Foundation and the National 
Opinion Research Center (NORC), the integrated dataset can be made available to other NORC researchers 
to further understand the production of new technologies by small business entrants.    
 8 
new market opportunities than can sustain the innovating firm’s and the nation’s 
technological leadership and global competitiveness.  The unique integrated dataset of 
small business start-ups allows the examination of the effect of public financing on risky 
early-stage development of technology.   
In the 1980s, the U.S. government enacted a series of policy interventions to 
facilitate technological breakthroughs and innovations including the Bayh-Dole Act, the 
Stevenson-Wydler Act, the American Competitiveness Act, and the Small Business 
Development Act (which established the SBIR).  The perception at that time was that the 
U.S. was losing its technological leadership and global competitiveness.  These 
technology initiatives received bipartisan support.  Increasingly, however, policymakers 
have demanded empirical evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of these 
technology policy interventions.   The main pressure point is the federal fiscal deficit that 
stood at 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 and is projected to continue 
in the next decade (Congressional Budget Office, 2011).  The higher the fiscal deficit 
becomes, the stronger the demand for cuts in public programs, which include support for 
research and innovation in small businesses.  Two parallel movements in the public 
sector, evidence-based policy and performance management, are also gathering 
momentum (Cozzens & Melkers, 1997; Heinrich, 2007; Shapira & Kuhlmann, 2003).  
The demand to tie rigorous evidence and metrics (on which policy interventions work 
and do not work) with decisions about program design, funding and management 
highlights the importance of building and expanding our knowledge base on the 
performance of these technology policy initiatives.  The termination of the Advanced 
Technology Program (ATP) in 2007 is testament to the greater scrutiny of public 
 9 
investments in commercial R&D.  Although the SBIR has been reauthorized multiple 
times since its creation in 1982, the U.S. Congress has been lukewarm to recent 
initiatives to extend the program (Schacht, 2011).
8
 
This dissertation furthers our understanding of the consequences of research, 
innovation, and entrepreneurship policies and programs.  More fundamentally, it 
addresses whether a market failure exists in the production of early-stage technologies, 
that is, small high-tech business start-ups underinvest in productive capabilities to 
generate new technologies.  An answer to this question is necessary to determine if 
technology policy interventions are matched with actual market failures and not with 
theoretically derived and assumed private underinvestment in R&D (Tassey, 2007).  If 
firms do not underinvest in R&D, public resources are funding infra-marginal R&D 
projects (Wallsten, 2000), that is, R&D projects that would have been undertaken by 
small firms even without SBIR funding support.  On the other hand, if firms underinvest 
in R&D, the economy is less likely to discover new technologies that may undergird its 
future economic growth and material prosperity.  Firms that applied for but were not 
awarded with R&D funds either scaled back or abandoned the R&D project altogether, 
affecting innovation outputs and outcomes (Feldman & Kelley, 2003).   
The treatment selection model identifies the characteristics of small business start-
ups that contribute to successful SBIR application, selection, and participation, and thus 
expands our understanding of the characteristics of small high-tech start-ups that self-
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 In 2011, SBIR was temporarily extended by Public Law 112-17.  It was officially extended for another 6 
years, ending September 30, 2017, after H.R. 1540 (The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2012) was approved and signed into law by President Obama in December 21, 2011.        
 10 
select into SBIR and at the same time are adjudged potentially innovative by SBIR 
federal agencies.  The results may also inform firm-level strategy.  For example, it is 
possible that, ceteris paribus, start-ups that are located in knowledge networks like those 
found in California and Massachusetts are more likely to receive SBIR funding.  It is also 
possible that all other relevant factors considered, start-ups that have produced patents are 
more likely to receive SBIR funding.  The first result would suggest the importance of 
locating in knowledge-dense networks that facilitate innovations and the second result 
would suggest the importance of demonstrating absorptive capacity to increase the 
likelihood of participating in public financing programs.  The development of productive 
capabilities (Teece, 1986; Winter, 2003) creates opportunities for the innovating firm to 
outcompete other firms in the industry.  The innovating enterprise must use everything at 
its disposal, i.e., all resources available within its local knowledge network and the 
overall national innovation system to improve its productive capabilities.  Public 
resources from federal agencies that support enterprise innovation are one of the available 
resources that can be tapped to strengthen the dynamic capabilities of firms.  This 
dissertation contributes to our understanding of how SBIR resources may or may not 
strengthen the productive capabilities of small business start-ups.    
  
1.5. Organization of the Study 
Chapter Two reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of 
research and innovation policies and programs on firm outcomes and identifies gaps in 
the literature that the dissertation can potentially address.  Chapter Three discusses the 
counterfactual approach to causation, specifically the assumptions needed to apply the 
 11 
approach to treatment effects analysis.  Chapter Four discusses the implementation of 
matching and related estimators in causal analysis, the sample used in this study, and the 
empirical model of treatment selection and estimation.  Chapter Five presents descriptive 
statistics and the results of the SBIR treatment selection model.  Chapter Six discusses 
the empirical evidence on the treatment effect of the SBIR program on post-entry 
performance of small business start-ups.  Chapter Seven provides the conclusions and 
theoretical and policy implications of the study as well as recommendations for future 
research.         
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of public 
programs that support research and innovation in the commercial sector.  The first section 
presents the theoretical link between research, innovation, and technology policies that 
directly support private R&D and firm outcomes.  The second section summarizes the 
key findings of studies that examine the impact of these policies and programs.  The final 
section summarizes how this dissertation research extends or advances prior research.   
 
2.1. Theoretical Link Between Public R&D Support Programs and Firm 
Outcomes 
The theoretical support for public R&D programs originates from two research 
streams in economics: (1) the market failure argument derived from mainstream general 
equilibrium theory, and (2) the systems failure argument from the emerging evolutionary 
economic theory of technical change.  The following discussion centers on market and 
systems failure in the generation of new technology by small firms and new enterprises.  
 
2.1.1. Market Failure in the Production of Commercially Useful Knowledge 
The more often used economic rationale for the public financing of commercial 
R&D is the market failure argument (Feldman & Kogler, 2008; Steinmuller, 2010) 
derived through formal economic modeling (Hall, 2008) that dates back to Arrow’s 
(1962) seminal article on the economics of inventive ideas.      
 13 
The knowledge required by firms to produce innovation is not like any other 
economic commodity.  Although it can be traded or exchanged like conventional 
economic goods, the economic incentive to produce commercially useful knowledge is 
significantly weaker because innovators cannot realize a reasonable rate of return from 
their innovative activities (Geroski, 1995).   This is called the problem of appropriability, 
which results from the three generic sources of market failure: (1) indivisibilities,          
(2) public goods and externalities, and (3) uncertainties (Arrow, 1962; Dasgupta & 
David, 1987; Geroski, 1995; Hall, 2008).   
 
2.1.1.1. Indivisibilities  
 Undertaking R&D needs large fixed costs to set up the required technical 
manpower, facilities, and equipment.  Firms may have to commit at least a “critical 
minimum level of innovation effort” (Metcalfe, 1995, p. 424) before R&D programs are 
expected to produce desired innovation outputs.  The minimum scale requirement for 
R&D to be productive is higher for firms competing in the high-technology sector than 
their counterparts in the traditional sectors.  For example, R&D projects in the high-
technology sector may require specialized equipment or facility or a specific set of 
competencies from the R&D team,
9
 which becomes part of the fixed cost of R&D.  The 
minimum level of R&D effort results in indivisibilities, i.e., R&D facilities, equipment, 
and highly technical manpower can only be used efficiently when they are used at full 
capacity.  Alternatively stated, the production of innovation is characterized by 
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 For example, research in nanotechnologies is increasingly multidisciplinary.  
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economies of scale (Cohen, 2001):  the average cost of producing new product prototypes 
or production techniques or both declines as the firm engages in more R&D.  The 
presence of large fixed cost and economies of scale implies that large firms may be more 
efficient than small firms in conducting R&D and in introducing innovations into the 
economy.  The idea that large establishments are the most powerful drivers of 
technological progress can be credited back to Schumpeter (1942) and, more recently, to 
Galbraith (1967) and Lucas (1978).  There are reasons why generating innovations is 
more efficient in large enterprises, that is, why average cost declines as R&D effort 
intensifies in large enterprises.  Large firms possess complementary assets (e.g. large 
marketing and legal departments) that facilitate the production and protection of 
innovation (Teece, 1986; Winter, 2003).  Large and established firms can also take 
advantage of experience and cumulative learning to screen out technological dead-ends 
allowing them to focus on more promising and feasible R&D projects.  Small firms and 
start-ups, on the other hand, have limited financial and human resources to support R&D 
(Acs, 1999) and cannot enjoy economies of scale at lower levels of R&D effort.  In sum, 
the minimum size of R&D teams and indivisible R&D facilities (Metcalfe, 1995) 
discourage firms, especially small business start-ups, from producing more innovation.    
 
2.1.1.2. Public Goods and Positive Spillover Effects 
 Knowledge derived from either academic research or industrial R&D has 
properties of a public good, that is, it is both non-rival and partially non-excludable.
10
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 A pure public good is both non-rival and non-excludable.    
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Knowledge is non-rival because it is not diminished by extensive use.  For example, the 
technique to produce Intel microchips or the process to compress Seagate’s hard disks 
remains effective regardless of the number of times it is used in production, even by 
Intel’s and Seagate’s competitors.  This is akin to the consumption of national defense, a 
traditional example used in textbook exposition of a public good: when residents of the 
state of Georgia consume or enjoy the benefits of a strong U.S. national defense system, 
it does not mean that the residents of other states enjoy less national defense.  Most 
economic goods like personal computers, food, automobiles are rival goods.
11
  If 
knowledge is non-rival then the marginal cost of an additional user is technically zero, 
but more realistically, close to zero, because the transmission of knowledge is not 
costless.  As such, the private market will not provide knowledge resources efficiently 
when the price is set close to its marginal cost.  Secondly, knowledge is partially non-
excludable, that is, it is difficult to exclude others from using it.  The standard solution to 
non-excludability is the establishment of property rights, of which patents and copyrights 
are prime examples.  Without secure property rights, a Silicon Valley start-up, for 
example, may not be able to preclude other firms from reverse-engineering and copying 
its new product or production technique.  In the absence of a patent regime, competitors 
will just wait for innovating firms and copy their innovative ideas, discouraging firms 
from investing in R&D.  In short, non-excludability (or even partial non-excludability) 
encourages free riders to an innovation, weakening the general incentive to produce 
commercially useful knowledge.    
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 If there is only one Dell desktop PC in a Best Buy store and John bought it, it means that Jane will not be 
able to buy and enjoy the benefits of using the PC.   
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 Closely related to non-excludability is the positive spillover effect of innovative 
ideas.  The knowledge produced by a firm may be useful not only to other present or 
future R&D projects of the firm but also to other firms as well as scientists and engineers 
in universities and public R&D laboratories.  For example, advances in microchip 
technology by Intel will benefit its competitors as well as manufacturers of personal 
computers like Dell, Acer, and Apple.  A new commercial technology may also advance 
fundamental understanding of how the physical world works, and thus help extend the 
frontiers of scientific knowledge.  Thus, from a larger societal point of view, a new 
product or process benefits not only the innovating firm but also other actors in the 
national economy and even the larger global economy.  Due to this positive spillover 
effect, the marginal social benefit of the innovation is larger than the marginal private 
benefit that accrues to the innovator.  Because the innovating firm only considers its 
marginal private benefit, it produces potentially commercially useful knowledge below 
the socially optimal level.
12
  
 The strength of the U.S. patent system may be insufficient to encourage small 
firm innovation.  Cooper (2003) argued that small and new enterprises lack both (1) legal 
resources to protect their innovation from imitation, and (2) the market power to extract 
monopoly rents from their newly introduced innovation.  Moreover, the patent system 
provides protection in only a very limited number of sectors (Geroski, 1995).  The 
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 Another example of an economic good with positive externality effects is basic education.  The whole 
economy/society benefits when its citizens/residents consume more basic education as the latter is 
associated with more responsible citizenship and greater productivity.  But because the individual only 
considers the benefit that he will enjoy with each additional year of basic education, and not the additional 
benefit that the whole society will enjoy, he is likely to consume less basic education than what the whole 
economy desires.      
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calculation of a lower marginal private benefit (due to non-excludability and spillover 
effects) by small firms and start-ups further lowers their innovation output away from the 
socially optimal level of innovation.  Instead of performing more R&D, small enterprises 
may just rely on knowledge spillovers from academic research to generate innovative 
outputs (Feldman, 1994).
13
     
 
2.1.1.3. Risks and Uncertainties  
The risks and uncertainties associated with the process of generating innovation 
involve both (1) the outputs of R&D and (2) the financing of R&D activities.  The two 
are inextricably linked because the second proceeds from the first.  Innovative activities 
are difficult to finance because their output is highly uncertain.   
The difficulty in financing innovation projects arises from the (1) technical,    
(2) market, and (3) competitive uncertainties in the production of innovation.  First, the 
output of R&D is not a monotonic function of R&D inputs.  Without dynamic 
capabilities and complementary assets (Nelson, 1996; Teece, 1986), firms cannot easily 
translate more R&D inputs into more innovation outputs.  The creative process involved 
in innovation has a random element; business experimentation involves a lot of trial-and-
error and the desired outputs and outcomes may not be achieved on the first few attempts.  
Second, the product prototype may not work on a commercial scale; for example, it may 
not be amenable to mass production, limiting market potential.  In addition, the newly 
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 This assumes that academic research is linearly connected with product and process innovations at the 
firm level.  It also presupposes sufficient absorptive capacity of small and new firms to capture the 
economic benefits of academic research. 
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introduced product may not enjoy market demand at a volume sufficient to recoup the 
cost of R&D.  As Bhide (2008) has argued convincingly, firm innovation also involves 
significant risk-taking on the part of consumers; for example, personal computers and 
mobile phones (and now, smart phones) may not have been successful commercially 
without consumers taking risks that these new high-tech products have important 
personal economic uses.  Third, the possibility remains that a competing firm develops a 
similar or more superior product or technology, limiting the returns to R&D or, worse, 
driving the firm out of the market.  These uncertainties drive private enterprises to 
become risk-averse, discriminating against high-risk but potentially high-return R&D 
projects.  Risk-averse businesses tend to produce only incremental innovation, not 
radical, cutting-edge, new-to-the-world innovation.  Worse, they may opt to place their 
bets on the status quo, ignoring, for example, new production methods that have been 
tried,  tested, and used by other firms.  These strategic decisions that are influenced by a 
negative risk evaluation affect long-run productive capabilities for innovation.     
The technical, market, and competitive uncertainties of engaging in R&D and 
innovation are more pronounced in small firms and start-ups than in large and established 
firms.  Business start-ups may not possess sufficient absorptive capacity to develop the 
intended products and processes and the experience and network to take these 
innovations successfully to the market.  More fundamentally, they may lack market 
research capability to establish demand before developing the intended new product or 
technology.       
The second aspect is the uncertainty that results from the information 
asymmetry between entrepreneurs and providers of capital including banks and external 
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investors (e.g. venture capitalists and angel investors), leading to a higher cost of external 
capital (Hubbard, 1998).  Financiers may be reluctant to extend credit in the absence of a 
credible market signal of the quality and prospect of the firm’s innovation project.  When 
the innovation project is perceived as risky, capital providers usually require an extra 
premium to extend credit, pushing up the cost of external capital.  Toole and Turvey 
(2009) have argued that information asymmetries in the financing of innovation are more 
problematic for small R&D performing firms.  This problem is compounded when the 
stage of technology development cycle is factored in.  Cooper (2003) found that small 
businesses do not have sufficient funding at the early stage of R&D, implying that capital 
providers are risk-averse in extending credit to innovation projects that are not “near-
market” (Lerner, 1999; Shane, 2004).  This leads to a substantial “financing gap” 
(Branscomb & Auerswald, 2003) that deprives firms that are willing to assume a portion 
of the risks the resources to develop early-stage technologies.   
When external capital is difficult to secure, firms may rely only on internal 
capital.  But internal capital is also limited, especially to small business start-ups.  When 
external capital from financiers is prohibitively high and internal capital from the 
entrepreneurs themselves is limited, economically viable R&D projects may not be 
undertaken, generating a social welfare loss.   
 
2.1.2. Systems Failure  
The evolutionary economic theory of economic change and the systems theory of 
innovation (Dahlman & Nelson, 1995; Lundvall, 1992; Metcalfe, 1995; Nelson, 1993; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982) provide a much broader justification for technology and 
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innovation policy, arguing that firms, especially small firms, have to conduct research 
and development (R&D) on their own and experiment on their own, in order to 
strengthen their absorptive capacities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), necessary to 
understand the current technological frontier, and access relevant technologies externally.  
These theories do not consider uncertainties, information spillovers, and the public good 
nature of knowledge as market failures.  They argue instead that these so-called market 
failures are fundamental features of the market system (Metcalfe, 2007, 1995), and as 
such, they do not justify the adoption and implementation of technology policies to 
correct these market “imperfections.”   
Evolutionary theory perceives the generation and diffusion of innovation as a 
systems problem.  Economically useful knowledge is not produced and disseminated 
when the system of innovation fails.  Metcalfe (2007) identified at least two ways in 
which the innovation system may fail: (1) knowledge actors are missing, and                 
(2) connections among producers of knowledge, among users of knowledge, and between 
producers and users of knowledge are absent.  Thus, a firm may fail to produce 
innovation if its (1) absorptive capacity and (2) connection with knowledge producers 
and users in the innovation system are missing or not functioning.  One of the means to 
increase absorptive capacity and connect with other system innovation actors is to 
conduct R&D.  Systems theory suggests policy interventions to shoulder private sector 
risks in performing innovative activities to raise the experimental behavior of firms 
(Metcalfe, 2007), expand their absorptive capacity, and induce them to network with 
other users and producers of innovation as well as capital providers.   
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2.1.3. SBIR as a Solution to the Appropriability Problem and System Failure   
The SBIR is an R&D subsidy to small firms, specifically to small high-tech firms.  
It can be construed as a government venture capital initiative where public financing 
underwrite the research and development of early-stage technologies and processes 
(Branscomb & Keller, 1998; Lerner, 1999).  As Borrus and Stowsky (1999) put it, 
technology programs like the SBIR, which stimulate the development of new industrial 
technologies, could be regarded as bets on the country’s technological future.   
The SBIR subsidy helps small firms satisfy the required minimum scale of R&D 
(e.g. minimum size and competence of the R&D team) necessary to achieve results.  It 
allows, for example, the hiring of university scientists or engineers to spearhead or 
support its R&D effort.  More importantly, the SBIR grant may also enable the recipient 
small firm to engage in more R&D projects and thus utilize whatever R&D facility and 
equipment it has set up originally to full capacity.  Engaging in more R&D projects while 
utilizing the same level of resources the firm possessed prior to the SBIR grant decreases 
the unit cost of innovation to be derived from the new and more intensified R&D effort.  
The recipient’s innovative effort becomes less costly at a larger scale of R&D, which is 
exactly the competitive advantage of large firms with large R&D departments over small 
firms with meager R&D budgets.            
Public financing shifts the recipient-firm’s marginal cost to the right (David, Hall 
& Toole, 2000; Metcalfe, 1995) pushing its innovation effort theoretically up to a level 
that closes the gap between the private level and the “socially optimal level” of R&D.  
The economy-wide benefits of more small firms conducting R&D in the high-technology 
sector as a result of the availability of SBIR grants multiply when the knowledge derived 
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from publicly co-financed R&D spills over to other users and producers of innovations.  
Public financing also alleviates the risks and uncertainties of the outcomes of R&D effort.  
By providing small firms the opportunity to engage in longer-term R&D, SBIR enables 
recipients to have a better estimate of the reward and risk of developing their intended 
new products or processes.  Using the SBIR research grant, a better evaluation of the 
probability of technical and market success will encourage the recipient small firm to 
further develop the technology in the future with or without public financing.  The 
prospect of having federal agencies procure the proposed technology to pursue their 
agency missions also lowers market uncertainties for some SBIR-financed research 
projects.  The increase in the innovation effort of recipient firms as a result of public 
financing alleviating the problems of indivisibilities, technology spillovers, and negative 
risk evaluation is the so-called additionality effect of research, innovation, and 
technology policies (Clarysse, Wright, & Mustar, 2009; Georghiou, 2002).   
The SBIR program offers financing to new innovative small enterprises to 
develop unproven but promising technologies (Toole & Czarnitzki, 2007).   The 
availability of public financing to small high tech firms at the seed or start-up stage of 
technology development, a critical stage in which private investors like venture capitalists 
are still reluctant to participate (Cooper, 2003), encourages small enterprises to pursue 
technological innovations (Gonzalez, Jaumandreu & Pazo, 2005).           
The SBIR grant can also have a halo or certification effect specifically in the 
application for external capital (Lerner, 1999; Link & Scott, 2010).  Recipient small firms 
can leverage their SBIR awards to signal the “viability of the project and the company” 
(Siegel, Wessner, Binks, & Lockett, 2003, p. 124).  SBIR’s certification effect is similar 
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to the warranty effect in Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons” market problem14; the SBIR funding 
certifies that the innovation project is not a “lemon” and thus is worthy of capital infusion 
or credit extension at a rate lower than what would be possible when the capital providers 
do not have a hint on the quality of the innovation project.  Using a Net Present Value 
model, Toole and Turvey (2009, p. 45) have shown that when initial public investment 
(such as that provided by SBIR grants) are used “to support research necessary to reduce 
technical and market uncertainties,” capital providers will be encouraged to undertake 
follow-on investment.  Thus, SBIR funding helps address the information asymmetry 
problem by certifying that the proposed new technology is both (a) “scientifically sound” 
and (b) “commercially promising” (Feldman & Kogler, 2008, p. 442), providing the extra 
push to financiers to extend additional capital funding.  Lerner (1999) showed that small 
firms that received SBIR grants are three times more likely than non-recipients to attract 
venture capital, a finding validated by a more recent study by Toole and Turvey (2009) 
who documented that SBIR Phase I grants have a positive effect on receiving follow-on 
external private investment.   
  From an evolutionary economic perspective and national innovation systems 
approach, which rejects the role of public policy to achieve an “optimal” state of the 
innovation system, R&D subsidy programs like the SBIR are meant to “influence the 
nature of the knowledge base of the firm” and to “increase absorptive capacity” (Soete, 
Verspagen & Weel, 2010, p. 1169).  The innovation system fails when producers of 
innovation, which are generally firms, do not have the capacity to translate or at least 
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 The product warranty certifies that the product is not a lemon. 
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adapt existing innovations and research produced by other firms, universities, and other 
research institutes to products, processes, marketing strategies, or organizational forms 
that can increase their own productivity and competitive advantage.  The SBIR grant 
enables small firms to experiment with new processes, technologies, and organizational 
forms providing a critical opportunity for firms to learn by doing.  Not all firm 
innovations are derived entirely from R&D; they also originate among others from the 
production floor, interactions between technical and nontechnical personnel, and 
interactions with users and customers.  SBIR funding can have long-run learning effects 
that enhance the efficiency of future R&D programs of the recipient firm (David, Hall & 
Toole, 2000).    
This dissertation focuses on testing the additionality and certification effects of 
the SBIR program as well as its effects on other metrics of post-entry performance like 
sales and employment size.   
 
2.2. Related Studies 
2.2.1. R&D Subsidy Studies 
Existing research on the public financing of enterprise innovation has focused on 
testing the input additionality of R&D subsidies, asking whether public support for 
commercial R&D stimulates or crowds-out private R&D spending.  [For a review of 
R&D studies, see David, Hall, and Toole, 2000; and Klette, Møen, and Griliches, 2000.]   
Research and innovation policy evaluation studies have concentrated almost 
exclusively on European countries, due in large part to data availability.  For example, 
Aerts and Czarnitzi (2004) evaluated the impact of R&D programs in Belgium; Czarnitzi 
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and Licht (2006) and Hussinger (2008) in Germany; Clausen (2009) in Norway; and 
Busom (2000) and Gonzalez and Pazo (2008) in Spain.  Since 1993, the European Union 
(EU) has conducted Community Innovation Surveys (CIS), which gather information to 
measure the effect of public funding on firm innovation inputs, outputs, and outcomes.
15
  
The U.S. does not have a comparable national firm innovation survey.
16
  The only US 
firm survey that comes close to the CIS, which uses the Oslo Manual to measure 
innovation input and outputs, is the Georgia Manufacturing Survey conducted by the 
Georgia Tech Enterprise Innovation Institute.  A number of studies have also focused on 
other member-countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) using national R&D and innovation surveys of firms:  Ozcelik and Taymaz 
(2008) on Turkey, Hall and Maffioli (2008) on Chile, Berube and Mohnen (2009) on 
Canada, Koga (2005) on Japan, and Lee and Cin (2010) on Korea.   
These evaluation studies used cross-section, pooled cross-section, or panel data in 
their empirical analysis of the additionality effect of R&D subsidy programs.  In terms of 
methods, most of these R&D subsidy studies have recognized the endogeneity of R&D 
subsidy programs. R&D subsidies are endogenous primarily because they are not 
randomly provided to firms.  Firms self-select into these public subsidy programs.  
Accordingly, firms that apply for public financing are systematically different from those 
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 The CIS includes questions on product and process innovation, innovation activity and expenditure on 
R&D, effects of innovation, innovation cooperation, and public funding of innovation.  The CIS contains 
the necessary information to measure the effect of public funding on firm innovation inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes.  The 4th CIS was carried out in 2005 in 27 EU member states and three European Free Trade 
Area and EU candidate countries (OECD, accessed August 2010). 
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 The National Science Foundation (NSF) has sponsored a new Business R&D and Innovation Survey 
(BRDIS) which measures new variables like worldwide R&D expenses, R&D employee headcount, R&D 
expenses, and share of R&D devoted to new business areas and new science or technology activities.  The 
NSF has released preliminary results from this survey.    
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that did not seek public funding.
17
  The second consideration is the selection guidelines 
and criteria of R&D-granting agencies; winning applicants are more likely to differ from 
losing applicants in a number of important ways.  In short, program or treatment selection 
is correlated with both observable and unobservable firm characteristics.  R&D studies 
have used rigorous statistical and econometric techniques like propensity score matching, 
instrumental variable estimation, and fixed effects panel data analysis to address the 
endogeneity issues that result from the nonrandom selection of firms into R&D support 
programs. 
The key finding from these R&D studies is that subsidized firms would have 
invested significantly less in R&D without the subsidy.  However, not all studies 
concluded the absence of crowding-out.  For example, Busom (2000) found that complete 
crowding-out cannot be ruled out in 30 percent of its Spanish sample while Clausen 
(2009) provided evidence that “development” subsidies in Norway substituted for private 
R&D spending.  A subset of these studies also looked at the effect of R&D grants on 
other firm outputs and outcomes but did not find conclusive results.  For example, 
Czarnitzi and Licht (2006) found a significant effect of public subsidies on patenting 
application among firms in Eastern Germany while Aerts and Czarnitzi (2004) did not 
find any significant difference in patenting behavior between subsidized and non-
subsidized firms in Belgium.        
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 In the same manner, individuals who self-select themselves into a public job retraining program are 
systematically different from those that did not opt to participate in the program.      
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2.2.2. SBIR Studies 
This section reviews the data and statistical methods used by studies that 
specifically evaluated the SBIR.   
The early evaluation of SBIR was provided by Lerner (1999), Wallsten (2000), 
Link and Scott (2000), Audretsch, Wiegand and Wiegand (2002), and Audretsch, Link 
and Scott (2002).   Lerner (1999) is the first attempt to evaluate the long-term impact of 
the SBIR program, with observations spanning over 10 years from 1983 to 1997.  Its 
sample included (a) 541 small firms that received Phase II awards and (b) a comparison 
sample that received only Phase I awards, small firms matched on firm size and industry 
classification, and another set of small firms matched on firm size and geographical 
location.  Lerner showed that SBIR-supported firms grew significantly faster in both 
volume of employment and sales than non-recipient small firms of similar geographic 
location and industry classification. He also found that SBIR awards interacted with local 
venture capital activity, that is, recipients had better sales and employment outcomes only 
in areas with substantial venture capital activity.  SBIR had no impact on firm outcomes 
in areas where few institutions that provide external capital funding operate.   
Wallsten (2000), in contrast, is a short-term evaluation of SBIR in terms of its 
input additionality effect.  Its sample included (a) 367 small firms that received at least 
one SBIR award for the period 1990-92 and (b) comparison sample of small firms 
composed of 90 rejected firms (i.e., firms that applied for SBIR funding but was not 
awarded) and 22 eligible firms that did not apply for SBIR funding.  Using an 
instrumental variable approach, he showed that SBIR crowded-out firm-financed R&D, 
disconfirming the input additionality hypothesis.   
 28 
Wallsten (2000) and Lerner (1999) artificially constructed their comparison 
samples.  The treatment sample and the comparison sample were obtained from different 
distributions.  Manually matching on industry classification and geographic location may 
not have been sufficient to remove the endogeneity bias that results from the nonrandom 
selection of SBIR awardees.   
Audretsch, Wiegand and Wiegand (2002), Audretsch, Link and Scott (2002), and 
Link and Scott (2000) only used SBIR recipients in their empirical analysis.  The first 
study used (a) case studies of 12 SBIR recipient firms and (b) a mail survey of another 20 
SBIR recipient firms in Indiana to show that SBIR influenced the career paths of 
academic scientists and engineers to form new firms.  The second study used tobit 
regression on 112 Department of Defense (DOD)-supported SBIR recipients to show that 
SBIR-supported firms commercialized new products and services developed through 
SBIR funding.  Link and Scott (2000) also interviewed SBIR awardees for 44 projects 
and estimated that the social rate of return of SBIR funding was at least 84 percent, that 
is, SBIR projects were socially valuable.   
The main disadvantage of the second set of studies is that the sample was 
restricted to SBIR-supported small firms.  By design, these studies are reflexive studies 
or before-and-after studies; the small firms themselves were used as controls.  The 
weakness of these reflexive studies is that they cannot rule out selection and endogeneity 
bias (Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004).  It was possible that SBIR-supported firms 
commercialized the products and processes they generated through SBIR because they 
spent more in R&D, had a more capable management team, were more networked, were 
located in regions where external financing was easier to secure, and a host of other firm-
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level and location-specific factors that positively impact firm performance.  Comparing 
the performance of small firms before and after SBIR funding does not also rule out 
simultaneity; more innovative firms are more likely to receive SBIR funding and to be 
more innovative in the future.  In short, in the presence of selection and simultaneity, 
studies that used only recipient firms are seldom internally valid; we cannot rule out the 
effect of other factors outside of the SBIR award.  More rigorous alternative methods to 
the reflexive approach are methods motivated by the counterfactual approach to 
causation, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  The counterfactual approach to 
causation compares the post-funding outcomes of SBIR-financed small firms with the 
post-funding outcomes of observationally similar or comparable group of small firms that 
did not receive R&D subsidy. 
Lerner’s study used non-statistical matching to construct a comparison sample for 
541 SBIR-recipient firms.  The idea was to balance the characteristics of the two groups 
(i.e., the recipient firms and the matched firms) before their outcomes were compared.  
However, the study used only two variables simultaneously (i.e., firm size and industry 
classification, and firm size and geographical location) to find non-SBIR firms that 
matched the SBIR-funded firms on these two attributes.  It is clearly an attempt to 
construct the counterfactual outcome of SBIR-funded firms (instead of just comparing 
their pre- and post-funding outcomes as is practiced in before-and-after studies), but 
matching only on two variables may not be sufficient to control for endogeneity or 
selection bias.  The SBIR-supported firms and non-supported firms may still be 
systematically different from each other even when firm size and geographical location 
(and firm size and industry classification) were controlled for at the baseline.  For 
 30 
example, SBIR-financed firms may be older, have spent more R&D, have a higher ratio 
of scientific and technical personnel (as opposed to non-technical and administrative 
personnel), grown faster, and a host of other factors that confound the cause-and-effect 
relationship between SBIR funding and firm performance.  Controlling these other 
factors in a regression framework may not be enough (Gellman and Hill, 2007; Ho, Imai, 
King & Stuart, 2007).  Wallsten (2000) also constructed a comparison sample that 
included rejected firms and potentially eligible firms that did not apply for SBIR funding.  
The comparison sample may not have come from the same distribution as that of the 
treated sample.  It is also possible that since the two groups of firms are not balanced in 
pre-treatment characteristics, the regression was forced to infer beyond the data.  As we 
will see in the next chapter, differences in pre-treatment characteristics between recipient 
and non-recipient firms makes the empirical results dependent on functional forms (Ho, 
Imai, King & Stuart, 2007).          
                            
2.3. Summary Discussion 
Most SBIR studies only used recipient or treated firms in the empirical analysis.  
The survey methodology literature (or even the economics literature on games and 
strategy) finds that asking program recipients to report the pay-off from participating in 
public programs (or any other programs for that matter in which they will potentially 
benefit in the future) may result in an upward bias in the estimation of the treatment 
effect parameter.  Two SBIR studies, specifically Lerner (1999) and Wallsten (2000), 
used non-recipient firms and employed techniques like instrumental variable estimation 
and non-statistical matching to address the endogeneity of R&D subsidy.  However, the 
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two studies combined the recipient sample with non-recipient sample that are not 
identically and independently distributed.  The use of rejected firms and firms that may 
not be eligible to participate in the SBIR program most likely did not lead to unit 
homogeneity between treated and untreated firms, which is a requirement for meaningful 
comparisons of mean outcomes between groups (Gelman & Hill, 2007).   
Advances in the micro-econometrics of program evaluation can better handle 
endogeneity and support the requirement of achieving unit homogeneity between groups 
to allow more meaningful causal inferences.  A key implication of Lerner (1999) and 
Wallsten (2000) is the need to use better data to establish causal connections between 
public R&D subsidy programs and firm innovation and productivity.  Empirical analysis 
of program effects using both recipient and non-recipient firms that are part of the same 
random sample of firms (like in EU’s CIS) is a significant improvement over synthetic 
samples that are manually combined as if they came from the same distribution.  This 
dissertation merges the Kaufmann Firm Survey, which is a survey of firms founded in 
2004 and subjected to follow-up surveys in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, with federal 
program databases to identify surveyed firms that received public R&D funding from 
SBIR.  The merged dataset is a unique inflow sample of small firms that either receive or 
did not receive SBIR funding from the federal government.   
Thus, this dissertation contributes to the literature on research and innovation 
policies and programs by measuring the treatment effect of the SBIR program using a 
better sample (i.e., an inflow sample of firms from the same random sample) and more 
rigorous methods from the advances in the micro-econometrics of treatment, policy, and 
program evaluation.             
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.The Neyman-Rubin-Holland Counterfactual Framework of Causal Analysis 
This dissertation seeks to identify the causal impact of a federal research and 
innovation program on firm-level outcomes.   
 A widely-accepted approach to causality is the counterfactual approach, which 
can be traced back to Lewis (1973).  Dissatisfied with the regularity approach to causality 
that requires universal conjunction of events to identify causes and effects, Lewis (1973) 
redefined “X has caused Y” as “Y would not have occurred if it were not for X” (Pearl, 
2009; Guo & Fraser, 2010).  Thus, the counterfactual approach to causality considers 
what would happen if X did not occur.  Before causality can be attributed from X to Y, 
Lewis (1973) requires the following two conditions (1) Y increased as a result of X, and 
(2) Y did not increase because X is not present.  In short, the presence of X should 
produce a net effect in Y and its absence a zero net effect.  To establish that X has caused 
Y, it is not enough to demonstrate that X and Y occurred together; the second condition, 
which is the counterfactual condition, must also be true.  To establish that the second 
condition is true, Lewis’s (1973) approach is to identify the “closest possible world,” 
where X does not occur, and observe that Y does not also occur.  To illustrate, following 
Brady (2008), if X is a government training program and Y is earnings, then the “closest 
possible world” can be defined as the world where the government training program does 
not occur but everything else (e.g. macroeconomic environment) is similar.  Following 
Lewis (1973), (1) if in the factual world both government training (X) and increase in 
 33 
earnings (effect on Y) occurred, and at the same time, (2) if in the “counterfactual” world 
(where everything else is similar with the factual world) except for the absence of the 
government training program, earnings did not increase, then one can argue that the 
government training program (X) causes earnings (Y) to increase.   
In statistics, the counterfactual approach to causation was further developed by 
Neyman (1923), Rubin (1974), and Holland (1986).  Thus, the counterfactual framework 
is commonly known as the Neyman-Rubin-Holland (NRH) counterfactual framework of 
causal analysis or treatment effects analysis.   
The NRH counterfactual framework assumes that every individual in the target 
population has two potential outcomes, i.e., (1) potential outcome with the treatment
18
 
and (2) potential outcome without the treatment (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Morgan & 
Winship, 2007; Woolridge, 2002).  For this reason, the NRH counterfactual framework is 
also known as the potential outcomes framework.  A causal effect or treatment effect is 
defined as the difference between the two potential outcomes.  Following the standard 
formalization of potential outcomes, let Yi1 denote the potential outcome for unit i if the 
unit receives the treatment (or participates in a program) and Yi0 denote the potential 
outcome for the same unit if it does not receive the treatment (or does not participate in a 
program).  Also, let Ti be a treatment indicator which is equal to 1 if unit i is treated and 0 
otherwise. Thus, the individual causal or treatment effect (ITE) i can be defined 
formally as: 
ITE = i = Yi1  -  Yi0         [1] 
                                                 
 
 
18
 A treatment can be a drug or a new therapy administered to patients, a training program offered to 
displaced workers, or an educational innovation applied to a set of students.    
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The observed (or realized) outcome Y for individual i is: 
Yi = TiYi1 + (1-T)Yi0       [2] 
Yi = Yi1 if Ti=1 
Yi = Yi0 if Ti=0 
Extending this definition for a single individual to a set of individuals, we may 
define the average treatment effect (ATE) as the difference between the mean potential 
outcomes, or more formally: 
ATE = E(i) = E(Yi1 ׀ Ti=1)  -  E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=0)    [3] 
We can also define the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).  ATE and 
ATT represent closely related but different population parameters.  ATE is the average 
causal effect of the treatment on randomly selected individuals in the target population.  
ATT, on the other hand, is the average causal effect for those that receive the treatment or 
participate in a program, i.e., those who have a high probability of receiving the treatment 
or program.  ATT is equal to ATE conditional on T being equal to unity.  Thus, ATT can 
be defined as:   
ATT = E(i ׀ Ti=1)    
        = E(Yi1 ׀ Ti=1 ) - E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=1)     [4] 
The so-called fundamental problem of causal inference (Holland, 1986) arises 
because only one of the potential outcomes is observable for each individual.  We cannot 
observe both potential outcomes simultaneously.  The counterfactual outcome, by 
definition, is not observable.  This is the central challenge of program evaluation or 
treatment effects analysis.  Let us consider both cases.  First, if the individual participates 
in a program (or receives a treatment), the first term Yi1 of Equation 1 is observable but 
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the second term Yi0 is not.  Likewise, if the individual is not a program participant (and 
therefore, not in the treatment state), the second term is observable but the first term is 
not.  Thus, using the NRH definition of causal connection, there is no direct way to 
identify the individual treatment effect for any particular case.   
By extension, the average causal effect ATE or ATT cannot also be estimated 
because only one of the two average potential outcomes [i.e., either E(Yi1) or E(Yi0) and 
either E(Yi1 ׀T=1 ) or E(Yi0 ׀T=1] is observable.  In short, the causal inference problem is 
a “missing data” problem.  As a result, the researcher cannot directly compare the 
observed factual outcome and the unobserved counterfactual outcome in order to infer 
causal effect (Brady & Collier, 2004).        
 
3.2.Solving the “Missing Data” Problem in Counterfactual Causal Analysis 
Finding a solution to the “missing data” problem is akin to being able to identify 
Lewis’s “closest possible world.”  Finding an empirical surrogate for Lewis’s 
counterfactual world is finding a substitute for the counterfactual outcome of interest.   
A set of assumptions has to be made to apply the NRH counterfactual framework 
in program evaluation or treatment effects analysis (Guo & Fraser, 2010; Sekhon, 2008).  
Without these assumptions, one cannot use observable outcomes as substitutes for 
unobservable counterfactual outcomes or make valid comparisons between observed 
outcomes of two groups.   
The first assumption is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), 
which assumes that the potential outcomes of individuals is unchanged (hence, “stable”) 
regardless of the changes in treatment status of other individuals (Morgan & Winship, 
 36 
2007).  That is, the treatment assignment for one individual does not influence the 
outcome of another (Gelman & Hill, 2007).  According to Heckman (2005), SUTVA 
rules out the following two situations: (1) effect of treatment assignment patterns on 
potential outcomes, and (2) social interaction and general equilibrium effects.  First, 
SUTVA is valid when potential outcomes do not vary with treatment assignment 
patterns.  Morgan and Winship’s (2007) example when SUTVA is violated is the 
situation in which potential outcomes change with the number of treated individuals, 
leading to the treatment becoming more or less effective as more individuals participate 
in the treatment.  Second, SUTVA is valid if the gain/loss an individual obtains from the 
treatment/program does not spill over to other individuals.  The assumption is thus 
violated when a treated individual interacts with an untreated individual benefitting the 
latter.  Without the SUTVA, it would be difficult to uniquely define individual causal 
effect (Brady, 2008).  For example, if treated individuals interacted with untreated 
individuals and spillover effects cannot be ruled out, then it would be difficult to isolate 
the treatment effect from the spillover effect.  Lewis’ “closest possible world” where 
everything else is the same except for the treatment is not achieved because the factual 
world and the empirical surrogate of the counterfactual world might also be the same in 
treatment status as a result of the spillover or interaction effect. 
The second assumption is the conditional independence assumption (CIA) or 
ignorability of treatment assumption, which can be formally expressed as: 
(Y0, Y1) ╨ T ׀ X, or      [5.a] 
(Y0, Y1) ⊥  T ׀ X              [5.b] 
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The CIA assumes that conditional on observed covariates X, the treatment and 
potential outcomes are independent.  Put differently, treatment assignment or treatment 
status conveys no information about the values of the potential outcomes after observable 
characteristics X are held constant.  It thus implies that participation in the program or 
treatment does not depend on expected outcomes, after controlling for the variations in 
outcomes dues to differences in X (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  The CIA is also called 
“selection on observables” because the conditioning covariates are assumed to be known, 
observed, and measured without error (Barnow, Cain, & Goldberger, 1980).  If the CIA 
holds then the treated individuals and untreated individuals will come to have the same 
mean values of Y0 and Y1 (Collier, Brady & Seawright, 2004).  This solves the “missing 
data” problem, because if the CIA holds, we can swap the observed outcomes of 
untreated individuals for the unobserved counterfactual outcome of treated individuals 
and the observed outcomes of treated individuals with the unobserved counterfactual 
outcomes of untreated individuals.  To summarize, causal inferences can only be made 
when both the SUTVA and the CIA are plausible.     
 
3.3. Achieving Conditional Independence or Ignorability of Treatment 
Assignment 
 
3.3.1 Experimental Studies 
The most effective way of achieving conditional independence or ignorability of 
treatment assignment is through an experimental research design. 
 38 
The key feature of the experimental design is randomization, i.e., experiments 
randomly assign individuals to either the treatment or control group.
19
  Randomization 
ensures that the potential outcomes are independent of treatment.  Knowing whether an 
individual receives treatment conveys no information whatsoever about his potential 
outcome under the treated state Yi1 or about his potential outcome under the control state 
Yi0.  If treatment is not randomly assigned, it is possible that individuals who think they 
will gain more from the treatment will self-select themselves into the treatment, and 
accordingly, knowing an individual’s treatment status may convey information about his 
potential outcomes, and thus treatment and outcomes are not independent.      
An experimental research design does not only satisfy the CIA [i.e., (Y0, Y1) ╨ T ׀ 
X]; it satisfies a stronger unconditional independence assumption [i.e., (Y0, Y1) ╨ T], 
which is also called full independence assumption.  Full independence implies 
conditional independence.
20
  If (Y0, Y1) and T are independent, then the mean potential 
outcomes of the treated and untreated groups in an experiment are equal.  More formally,   
E(Yi1 ׀ Ti=1) = E(Yi1 ׀ Ti=0) = E(Yi ׀ Ti=1)    [6.a] 
E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=1) = E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=0) = E(Yi ׀ Ti=0)     [6.b]  
 Equation 6.a states that the expected potential outcome of the treated when they 
are actually treated is equal to the expected potential outcome of the untreated had they 
been treated.  If this is the case, then we can use the observed outcome of the treated as 
empirical substitute for the unobserved counterfactual outcome of the untreated had they 
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 The classic experimental design also features measurement of the outcome variable before and after the 
intervention.   
20
 If variables X and Y are independent, then E(Y ׀ X) = E(Y).  
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been treated.  Equation 6.b states that the expected potential outcome of the untreated 
when not treated is equal to the expected potential outcome of the treated had they not 
been treated.  The implication is that we can also substitute the observed outcome of the 
untreated for the unobserved counterfactual outcome of treated had they not been treated.  
Thus, in experimental studies, in which the research design ensures that the treatment 
assignment and the outcomes are independent, the group mean difference of the treated 
and untreated groups can identify the ATE defined earlier in Equation 3: 
ATE = E(Yi1 ׀ Ti=1) - E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=0)   
            = E(Yi ׀ Ti=1)  -  E(Yi ׀ Ti=0)              by Eq. 6.a and 6.b 
ATE EstimatorEXPERIMENTS = E(YTREATED) - E(YCONTROL)   [7] 
           = E(Yi1) - E(Yi0) 
Experimental studies supply the correct unobserved counterfactual, thus solving 
the “missing data” problem in causal analysis.  The group mean difference between the 
treatment and control groups [i.e., E(Yi1) - E(Yi0)] provides consistent and valid estimates 
of the ATE.     
 
3.3.2  Observational Studies 
Experiments are usually not feasible in public policy research.  For example, it is 
not normally politically acceptable to randomize participation to welfare and anti-poverty 
programs, labor training programs, support programs for businesses, or any other public 
programs for that matter.
21
  Politics usually allow individuals of the target population to 
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 Randomization has been allowed in some education innovation programs.   
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self-select themselves into federal, state, or local public programs that they deem 
beneficial for themselves.  Using randomization, the government, for example, may 
award welfare programs only to select qualified applicants while keeping other qualified 
applicants in the control group.  This is neither ethically nor politically acceptable, 
especially in democratic polities.  In the context of this dissertation, an experimental 
research design to estimate the causal effect of research and innovation policies and 
programs is also very difficult to implement politically because it may require, for 
example, not awarding R&D program funds to “winning” firms and/or awarding program 
funds to “losing” firms just to establish the net contribution of the program to important 
output and outcome measures.  For all these reasons, policy researchers usually work 
with observational or non-experimental data in evaluating public policies and programs.   
Rosenbaum (2002, vii) defines an observational study as “an empiric 
investigation of treatments, policies, or exposures and the effects they cause… [where] 
the investigator cannot control the assignment of treatments to subjects.”   
In observational studies, the investigator has no direct control on the allocation of 
individuals to treatment or non-treatment states (Cox & Reid, 2000) and accordingly, 
treatments are observed (hence, the term “observational”) rather than assigned (Gelman 
& Hill, 2007; Brady & Collier, 2004).  In short, random assignment is missing.  The data 
from the KFS survey individually or in combination with other datasets that can identify 
firms that benefitted from federal S&T programs is an observational data.   
Without random assignment, the CIA assumption does not hold in observational 
studies.  Therefore, using the group mean difference between treated and untreated 
groups cannot identify the ATE.  This study follows Morgan and Winship (2007) and 
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calls the difference in observed outcomes of the treated and untreated groups (in 
observational studies) the naïve estimator.  In this case, we substitute (1) the unobserved 
counterfactual outcome of the treated group [i.e., E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=0)] with the observed 
outcome of the untreated group [i.e., E(Yi ׀ Ti=0)] and (2) the unobserved counterfactual 
outcome of the untreated group [i.e., E(Yi1 ׀ Ti=0)] with the observed outcome of the 
treated group [i.e., E(Yi ׀ Ti=1)].  The naïve estimator does not consistently estimate ATE 
because (1) E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=0) and E(Yi ׀ Ti=0) and (2) E(Yi1 ׀ Ti=0) and E(Yi ׀ Ti=1) are 
rarely equivalent when the CIA assumption is not plausible, and thus the “missing data” 
problem is unsolved.  The realized outcome of the treated group cannot substitute for the 
unobserved counterfactual outcome of untreated group, while the realized outcome of the 
untreated group cannot swap for the unobserved counterfactual outcome of the treated 
group as in Equations 6.a and 6.b in experimental studies when the independence 
assumption holds.  The naïve estimator will include a bias, as shown by Angrist and 
Pischke (2009): 
ATENAIVE = E(Yi ׀ Ti=1) - E(Yi1 ׀ Ti=0)     
   = [E(Yi1׀ Ti=1) - E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=1)] + [E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=1) - E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=0)] [8] 
                = ATT +  Selection Bias 
When the CIA does not hold, the naïve estimator will include a selection bias in 
its estimation of ATE.  When the CIA holds, the last two terms [i.e., E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=1) - E(Yi0 
׀ Ti=0)] of the second line of Equation 8 becomes zero because they will both be equal to 
E(Yi ׀ Ti=1) when potential outcomes are independent of the treatment assignment.  See 
Equations [6.a] and [6.b].   
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The last two terms in Equation [8] is the difference in Yi0s between those who are 
treated and those who are not.  This is the difference in potential untreated outcome 
between the two groups.  The selection bias (that results from the difference in Yi0s of the 
two groups) can be either positive or negative.  If the treated group has higher values of 
Yi0s  than the untreated group, the selection bias is positive, leading to an overestimation 
of the average causal effect.  This happens, for example, when those who self-select (or 
are selected by program administrators) and eventually admitted to say, a public training 
program are those who are better educated than those who did not participate in the 
program.  The potential outcomes of the better-educated treated group are expected to be 
higher than that of the untreated group.  In this case, treatment assignment is not 
ignorable or is not independent of outcomes; the value of the treatment indicator can 
yield information on the value of the potential outcomes.  A simple difference in group 
means will overestimate ATE.  In the same vein, if the treated group has lower values of 
Yi0s than the untreated group, the selection bias is negative, yielding an underestimation 
or even the elimination of the average causal effect altogether.  Using the same example, 
a negative selection bias occurs when those who self-select into the job training program 
have lower levels of education than those who did not participate in the program.   
Letting p equal the proportion of individuals who receives treatment, Morgan and 
Winship (2007) further decomposed the naïve estimator into ATE, differential treatment 
effect bias, and baseline bias as follows
22
: 
ATENAIVE = E(Yi ׀ Ti=1) - E(Yi1 ׀ Ti=0)     
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 It can be deduced from Morgan & Winship’s (2007) and Angrist & Pischke (2009) decomposition of the 
naïve estimator that ATE = ATT + Differential Treatment Effect Between Treated and Untreated Cases.    
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               = ATE + (1-p)[ E(i ׀Ti=1) - E(i ׀Ti=0)]  
      + [E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=1) - E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=0)]     [9] 
               = ATE +  Differential Treatment Effect Bias + Baseline Bias 
The differential treatment effect bias is equal to the difference of the treatment 
effect between those who self-select into the treatment and those who decided not to 
receive treatment.  Using the same example above, this type of bias results when the 
outcomes of those who are treated increase more than the outcomes of those who are not 
treated.  In short, the treated participants are more likely to benefit from the treatment 
than the untreated participants would if the latter get treated.  The baseline bias is 
equivalent to the selection bias of Angrist and Pischke (2009) in Equation [8]. 
To solve selection bias in observational studies, one of the techniques is 
covariance control
23
 either through (1) regression analysis or (2) matching.  Angrist and 
Pischke (2009) believes that when the CIA and other assumptions of the CLRM
24
 hold, 
the OLS estimate of the coefficient of a binary treatment variable in a regression of a set 
of observable attributes X and the treatment variable on an outcome variable can have a 
causal interpretation.  The strict exogeneity assumption in CLRM is often expressed as 
E(εi ׀X) = 0, which also implies that (1) the unconditional mean of the error term is zero, 
and (2) the observed covariates X are orthogonal to the error term, that is, E(xjεi) = 0 
(Hayashi, 2000).  Thus, strict exogeneity assumes the absence of (1) omitted variable 
bias, (2) simultaneity, (3) measurement error, (4) sample selection, and                          
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 Other methods include (1) Heckman’s sample selection model, (2) instrumental variable approach, and 
(3) regression discontinuity design.   
24
 A model is set of restrictions on or assumptions about the joint distributions of the outcome and 
explanatory variables (Hayashi, 2000).   
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(5) contemporaneous dependence (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Greene, 2003; Woolridge, 
2002; Hayashi, 2000), or in the context of Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger’s (1980) 
“selection on observables,” covariates X are known and observed.  When the assumptions 
of the CLRM hold (which include strict exogeneity), the regression coefficient  in the 
following linear regression model is an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009):   
Yi = τ+ Ti + Xi’γ + εi       [10] 
The estimate of the parameter  is obtained by minimizing the error sum of 
squares.  Assuming X is a vector of explanatory variables including the treatment 
variable T, the OLS estimate of  is: 
^= (X’X)T X’Y        [11] 
The basic assumption that the outcome variable is linear in the treatment variable 
may not be plausible in causal analysis.  The linearity assumption means that the 
treatment variable has a constant marginal effect on the expected values of the outcome 
variable Y.  This is violated, for example, when the treatment effect is higher for those 
who receive the treatment than those who did not receive the treatment had they been 
treated.  This is the case of differential treatment effect between treated and untreated 
cases as discussed above.  In causal analysis, a heterogeneous treatment effect is a more 
plausible assumption than a constant or homogenous treatment effect.  The linearity 
assumption of the CLRM is often violated in treatment effects analysis.   
More fundamentally, the strict exogeneity assumption in the CLRM model with a 
treatment indicator as one of the predictor variables may be very difficult to defend.  
Heckman and Robb’s (1989, 1986, 1985 as cited by Morgan and Winship, 2007) 
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decomposition of the ATE coefficient in an OLS regression model showed that OLS will 
most likely have an omitted variable bias (and thus violate the strict exogeneity 
assumption and the CIA) because of the absence of the variable to measure individual’s 
anticipation of the treatment effect, which theoretically is a significant predictor of 
outcomes.  If this is the case, then the selection is on unobservables (and not on 
observables), yielding an omitted variable bias, or simply endogeneity bias.  For this 
reason, the treatment variable is often modeled as endogenous in causal analysis, and not 
as an exogenous variable as in OLS models.  Parametric estimators like the OLS are 
model dependent and thus, susceptible to bias when the model is misspecified (Ho, Imai, 
King, & Stuart, 2007).    
Gelman and Hill (2007, p.199) have also shown that “causal inferences are 
cleanest if the units receiving treatment are comparable to those receiving the control.”  
They believe that it is difficult to control for the confounding covariates through OLS 
regression when the distribution of the covariates differ across treatment status.  
Moreover, Lee (2005) has argued that regression analysis forces the researcher to 
compare incomparable units, and thus the statistical technique is incompatible with the 
effort to find the “closest possible world.”  This is the reason why Ho, Imai, King and 
Stuart (2007) have recommended balancing the data before performing regression 
analysis.    
An alternative to regression analysis is matching, a method motivated directly by 
the counterfactual approach to causation.  It aim is to reorganize the original sample 
(Gelman & Hill, 2007), or more specifically, to create a synthetic sample (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005) or a strategic subsample (Morgan & Winship, 2007) that includes a 
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comparison group that is similar in observational attributes to the treated sample.  All 
treated cases are retained and all unmatched untreated cases (i.e., untreated cases that are 
not observationally similar with any of the treated cases) are dropped from this synthetic 
sample.  The sample of well-matched untreated units can serve as empirical surrogate for 
the control group that is constructed by randomization in experimental settings.  In this 
sense, matching can be construed as an attempt to mimic the randomization process in 
experimental studies (Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 2010) or to create a “quasi-
experimental contrast” (Morgan & Winship, 2007) by balancing observed covariates X 
across treatment status.  To review, the consequences of randomization are (1) the 
independence of treatment assignment and outcomes, and (2) the balancing of observed 
covariates X and unobserved factors ε between treatment and control groups.  When the 
two groups are balanced and under specific assumptions, the remaining differences in 
observed average outcomes between treated and untreated observations can be construed 
as the causal or treatment effect. 
Once the matched comparison sample has been constructed out of the larger 
dataset, causal parameters can be identified by a sample difference in average outcomes 
of the two groups.  An alternative technique is to use standard regression methods (e.g., 
linear regression, logistic regression) to estimate treatment effect in the area of overlap 
(Gelman & Hill, 2007; Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007).   
Matching assumes, in addition to SUTVA and the CIA, that an overlap exists 
between the distributions of observed covariates X of the treated and untreated cases.  
More formally, the overlap assumption is expressed as:  
O<Pr(T=1 ׀ X)<1       [12] 
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The overlap condition requires that there be untreated cases that have the same 
covariate distribution as the treated cases.  If this assumption is violated, there will be 
treated observations that cannot find a good match among the untreated observations.  
The CIA and the overlap assumption constitute what Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) calls 
the “strong ignorability of assignment” assumption, which is necessary for identifying the 
treatment effect.   
Heckman et. al (1998) showed that in the estimation of ATT, the CIA can be 
relaxed to mean independence, that is, the untreated outcomes are the same across 
treatment states.  More formally,  
Yi0 ╨ T ׀ X                 [13] 
which implies that,  
E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=1, Xi) = E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=0, Xi) = E(Yi0 ׀ Xi)   [14] 
The ATT as defined in [4] can thus be estimated by: 
ATT EstimatorMATCHING = EXi ׀T=1 [E(Yi ׀ Ti=1, Xi) - E(Yi ׀ Ti=0, Xi) [15] 
The outer expectation in [15] is taken over the distribution of Xi ׀T=1, that is, the 
distribution of observed X in the treatment group.  The overlap condition for identifying 
ATT requires that the support of X for the treated sample be a subset of the support of X 
for the untreated sample (Sekhon, 2008).  This implies that untreated observations whose 
covariate values are outside of common support will be dropped in the estimation of 
ATT.  Only treated cases and matched untreated cases are retained in the analysis.  
Dropping observations outside of common support will improve unit homogeneity 
between treated and untreated cases, making policy and program evaluation more 
meaningful (Guo & Fraser, 2010).  In addition, Rosenbaum (2005) has shown that 
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improving unit homogeneity
25
 (a) not only reduces variability of the estimates of 
treatment effects, (b) but also their sensitivity to unobserved bias.   
One of the advantages of matching estimators is that it is nonparametric.  Unlike 
the OLS estimator, it avoids the assumption that the treatment effect enters the 
conditional mean function linearly (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). More importantly, since 
matching excludes observations outside of common support, the analyst is not forced to 
compare incomparable units (Lee, 2005) making causal inferences more meaningful 
(Guo & Fraser, 2010).  It is also a especially useful method if ATT is the parameter of 
interest.  In policy analysis and evaluation, we are less concerned about the effect of the 
policy, program, or treatment on a randomly selected member of the population, which 
the ATE parameter represents.  In most cases, the more relevant parameter is ATT, which 
the matching estimator (and its variants) can identify.   
This dissertation uses matching estimators to construct the counterfactual 
outcomes of small business start-ups that received SBIR funding to measure the effect of 
public financing on the development of risky early-stage technology.    
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 Rubin (1974) and Holland’s (1986) definition of unit homogeneity is sufficient to allow causal inference 
without the CIA (Collier, Seawright, & Munck, 2004).   
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND MODELS 
 
 
4.1. Implementing Propensity Score Matching and Related Estimators 
 
This dissertation takes advantage of advances in statistical matching techniques to 
estimate the causal effect of SBIR on firm outcomes.  It also combines matching with 
regression-based methods.  Following Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007), I also use 
standard regression models (e.g. linear and logistic regressions) to estimate the effect of 
SBIR after balancing the data.  This is to ensure comparison between comparable groups 
(following the Neyman-Rubin-Holland counterfactual approach) when performing 
regression analysis. 
The central idea of matching is to control for observable heterogeneity by finding 
in the untreated group “look-alikes” of treated participants.  When implemented 
manually, matching is a tedious exercise.  In practice, matching directly on observable 
attributes becomes more difficult the larger the set of covariates to match.  This is called 
the “Curse of Attribute Dimensionality”.  For illustration purposes, let us assume that we 
are looking for a “look-alike” or a match of a small business start-up that has 10 
employees, is located in California, is currently competing in the computer equipment 
industry, performs in-house R&D, recorded a profit in 2005, and is managed by its 
owner-founder who has a postgraduate degree.  Finding a close match (much less an 
exact match) of this SBIR-recipient small firm is very difficult if not impossible.  This 
dimensionality problem can be significantly reduced by matching on the propensity 
score, i.e., the conditional probability of treatment or program participation.  Thus, 
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instead of an empirical strategy of constructing a comparison group with identical 
covariates X, the alternative strategy, which this dissertation adopts, requires a 
comparison group that has a similar distribution of covariates X with that of the treatment 
group by matching on the propensity score.  The propensity score is formally expressed 
as: 
Propensity Score = P(T=1׀ X)      [16]   
Thus, propensity score matching (PSM), which originated from Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983), is a statistical method to match treated and untreated cases on the basis of 
the propensity score, which is a scalar variable, instead of manually matching on a vector 
of variables.  If the strong ignorability of assignment assumption
26
 holds, the use of the 
matched comparison group to construct the counterfactual outcome of treated cases is 
sufficient to remove selection bias, yielding a valid and consistent estimate of the mean 
impact of treatment (Heckman et. al, 1998; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
To summarize, the aim of matching is to balance the covariate distribution 
between the treated sample and the matched comparison sample.  An important statistical 
result from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is that it is enough to match on the conditional 
probability of treatment or the propensity score.  On average, observations with the same 
distribution of propensity scores will have the same distribution of observed covariates X.  
Thus, matching on propensity scores, the ATT estimator in [14] can be reexpressed as:  
ATT EstimatorPSM = EP(Xi ׀T=1) [E(Yi ׀ Ti=1, Xi) - E(Yi ׀ Ti=0, Xi)] [17] 
                                                 
 
 
26
 Strong ignorability of assignment assumes both (1) presence of overlap and (2) mean independence.  See 
Equations 12-15 on pages 46-47.   
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The PSM estimator of ATT in [17] implies that untreated observations whose 
propensity scores are outside the support of the propensity scores of the treated 
observations will be discarded.   
To implement PSM, this dissertation followed the following matching protocol 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, 2005) to construct the comparison group for treated firms.  
First, I divided small business start-ups into (1) those that receive SBIR financing (the 
treatment group) and (2) those that did not (potential control group).  Second, I ran a 
logistic regression to model the participation of small business start-ups in the SBIR 
program and obtain estimates of their propensity scores.  PSM predicted the probabilities 
of participation (propensity scores) of both treated and untreated small business start-ups 
using relevant covariates to be discussed in section 4.3.  The propensity score model 
included variables that affect both treatment assignment and outcomes (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983; Gelman &Hill, 2007).   
Third, I excluded from the sample non-recipient small business start-ups whose 
propensity scores are either (1) lower than the minimum propensity score of the recipient 
small firms or (2) higher than the maximum propensity score of the recipient firms to 
satisfy the key identifying assumption of the PSM estimator, which is the presence of a 
“common support” between the two groups.   
Fourth, I paired each participant i with some group of comparable non-
participants on the basis of the estimated propensity scores. I used the nearest neighbor 
matching algorithm i.e., search for non-participant j with the closest propensity score.  I 
followed Abadie and Imbens (2002) who suggested using four matches for each treated 
participant.      
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Fifth, I assessed matching quality. The matching procedure should balance the 
distribution of the relevant independent variables in both the treatment and the 
comparison group.  After the matching, the covariates should be balanced in both groups 
and hence no significant difference should be found. If there are significant differences, 
covariate balancing is not completely successful and remedial measures are necessary.  
For instance, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) recommended including high-order 
polynomial terms and/or cross-product interaction terms in the estimation of the 
propensity score to improve the match between the treatment and comparison groups.  
Sixth, I computed the treatment effect as the difference between the mean 
outcome of the treatment group and the mean outcome of the comparison group.  
Specifically, the input additionality effect is the difference in the mean R&D 
expenditures of SBIR recipients and the mean R&D expenditures of observationally 
similar non-recipient small business start-ups and the certification effect is the difference 
in mean external financing.  Estimating the treatment effect on other firm-level outcomes 
(e.g. employment and innovation propensities) followed the same approach.  For 
statistical inference, the standard error of the treatment effect was estimated using Abadie 
and Imbens’ (2006) bias-corrected variance estimator.    
In the treatment effects analyses, the size of the comparison and treated 
subsamples varies from one model to another.  PSM balances the covariate distribution of 
the recipient and non-recipient groups by dropping untreated observations that are not 
observationally similar to the treated cases.  Recipient small firms that are off common 
support and those with missing values for a particular outcome variable will also be 
dropped from the treatment effects analyses.                
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Finally, following Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007) and Gelman and Hill (2007), 
I also estimated the treatment effect by using regression-based methods after the 
observable characteristics of the treated and matched comparison subsamples.  
Regression analysis was only applied within the common support of X between the two 
groups.  For example, a linear regression as in [10] can be estimated.  In the case of a 
dichotomous outcome variable, the following logistic regression where  is the key 
parameter of interest can be fitted by maximum likelihood estimation. 
log (Yi/1-Yi) = τ+ Ti + Zi’γ + εi      [18] 
In a regression framework, the estimate of the treatment effect is the coefficient 
() of the binary treatment variable T.  The regression coefficient  is interpreted as the 
difference in mean outcomes between SBIR recipients and non-recipients, holding 
constant a set of confounding variables Z in the model.  For statistical inference, the OLS 
variance estimate V(α^) is:   
V(α^) = s2 (X’X)-1                                                                              [19] 
where the estimate of the error variance (s
2
) = SSE/(n-k) = e’e/(n-k).27                                                                 
 
4.2. Data and Sample 
 
The data for this study comes from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS).  The 
Kauffman Foundation has granted me access to their confidential KFS micro-data 
through the data enclave managed by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). 
                                                 
 
 
27
 SSE is the sum of squared error, n is the sample size, and k is the number of regressors including the 
constant. 
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The KFS is an inflow sample of 4,928 businesses founded in 2004 and tracked ever since.  
In an inflow sample, data collection is based on a random sample of all individuals (in 
this case, firms) entering the state of interest (in this case, entrepreneurship or operating a 
business) and followed until some pre-specified date, or until the spell ends (Jenkins, 
2004).  In short, the KFS is a longitudinal survey of the same cohort of firms that started 
operation in 2004.  From a research design standpoint, this inflow sample or cohort 
sample structure ensures that the start-up firms faced the same external environment 
during their founding year and subsequent years of operation.  For example, using an 
inflow sample we can dismiss the confounding effect of macroeconomic variables such 
as inflation rate, interest rate, or consumer confidence because all members of the 
inflow/cohort sample have been exposed to the same external factors since their founding 
in 2004.  In contrast, using a standard population sample based on a general survey of 
firms, we might be comparing a small firm founded in 1980 and a second small firm 
founded in 1990.  The economic environment in the 1980s is different from that of the 
1980s.  An inflow or cohort sampling design minimizes confounding factors such as the 
effect of a more favorable external environment on starting a business.      
I also requested the Small Business Administration (SBA) to provide me a 
datasheet of SBIR and STTR recipients from 2004-08.
28
  The start period of the SBIR 
recipient database coincides with the start of the KFS.  To identify start-ups in the KFS 
sample that also received SBIR financing, I requested the Kauffman Foundation and the 
                                                 
 
 
28
 SBA provided the data through formal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.  I purchased the data 
from SBA for $400.   
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Mathematica Policy Research
29
 to integrate the KFS and the SBIR recipient datasets.  
The data integration used the Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number of the 
sample firms as merging variable.  The DUNS number is a unique numeric identifier 
assigned to a single business entity making it an ideal merging variable.  The integrated 
dataset identified 25 small business start-ups that received SBIR financing to develop 
new technologies in 2007-08.  In the empirical analysis, each of these 25 recipient small 
business start-ups is matched with at most four (4) observationally similar non-recipient 
small business start-ups.   
I restricted the sample of potential controls to small firms.  I dropped from the 
analysis all start-ups that have more than 500 employees prior to the 2007-08 treatment 
period.       
   
4.3. Propensity Score Model 
 
This dissertation estimates the effect of receiving SBIR financing on firm-level 
innovation inputs, outputs, and outcomes of small business start-ups.  The primary 
estimator is the propensity score matching (PSM) estimator.  As discussed in Section 4.1, 
the propensity score model includes covariates that affect both program participation and 
selection and firm-level outcomes (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Gelman & Hill, 2007).   
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
29
 Mathematica conducted the KFS survey for the Kauffman Foundation.   
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4.3.1. Post-entry Performance (Y): Inputs, Outputs, and Outcomes 
Post-entry performance of small business start-ups is measured by several 
indicators.  A common measure of innovation input is R&D expenditure.  It can be 
measured either as an interval-level variable (in dollars) or a dichotomous variable coded 
1 if the small business start-up engaged in R&D in 2008 and/or 2009 and 0 otherwise.  
Measures of innovation outputs include (a) patents and (b) product and process 
innovations.  A patent is awarded to inventions that are both novel/non-obvious and 
useful.  A product innovation is the introduction of a new or significantly improved good 
or service, whereas a process innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved process or method of providing services.   
Another measure of post-entry performance is the ability of start-ups to attract 
external capital (e.g. loans, venture capital) necessary to run day-to-day operations, start 
production, or to expand the business.  Traditional measures of performance like 
employment size were also used.   
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Propensity Score Model 
SELECTION 
INTO THE SBIR  
PROGRAM 
Firm Inputs/Outputs/Outcomes 
- Innovation Effort 
- Ability to Attract External 
Capital 
- Sales, Employment, etc. 
Antecedent/Confounding 
Variables (Z) 
-  Firm Size 
-  Human Capital 
-  Technological Capacity 
-  Industry 
-  Geographical Location 
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4.3.2. Treatment Variable (T) 
The treatment variable is a binary variable coded 1 if the small business start-up 
received SBIR/STTR funding in the 2007-08 period and 0 otherwise.   
 
4.3.3. Covariates (X) that Affect Both Treatment Selection (T) and Post-entry 
Performance (Y)  
I hypothesize that selection into the SBIR/STTR program as well as post-entry 
performance are affected by the start-up’s size, human capital, technological capacity, 
industry, and location of operation. 
 
4.3.3.1. Firm Size 
Larger business start-ups have more resources to attract quality manpower, 
withstand random shocks in the external environment, and raise more capital for 
operation, production, and expansion.  Larger firms are also more likely to possess 
specialized complementary assets (e.g. specialized channels of information) to 
successfully commercialize a new production technique or product prototype (Teece, 
1986).      
Firm size can also serve as proxy for the start-up’s efficiency and ability to 
compete (Bruderl, Presisendorfer & Ziegler, 1992).   Starting a new enterprise is 
inherently risky; thus, firms that have larger resource endowments in their initial years 
may be firms that are more confident about the efficiency of their production levels and 
more optimistic ex-ante about their probability of success in the market.  If efficiency and 
ability to compete underlie the choice of a start-up’s initial size, then external parties can 
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use firm size to draw inferences about the quality of the firm.  Unlike established small 
businesses, start-ups do not have a track record to speak of when applying for an SBIR 
grant.  SBIR reviewers can use firm size as one of the filters to separate start-ups that 
have the potential to take advantage of the R&D grant from those that do not.  Firm size 
is measured by the number of employees of the start-up at the start of its business 
operations in 2004.    
 
4.3.3.2. Human Capital of the Entrepreneur 
Human capital refers to the knowledge, skills, and experience that the founders or 
owners of the start-up possess.  It increases the ability of the start-up to compete 
successfully.  At a strategic level, the knowledge assets of the entrepreneur are critical in 
searching for and recognizing new business opportunities that are commercially 
promising (Shane, 2000).  Research in entrepreneurship and creativity has shown that the 
breadth of one’s training and experience strengthens the ability to relate two seemingly 
unrelated concepts to create something novel and useful.   At the operational level, 
greater human capital of the founders increases firm productivity.  Owners with more 
knowledge and experience are more efficient in organizing and more capable at attracting 
clients and external support (e.g. loans, research grants).  More knowledgeable and 
experienced entrepreneurs also bring with them best-practice organizational routines that 
are important in running day-to-day operations and planning for the long-term (e.g. new 
markets to exploit and new products and processes to develop).  In short, like firm size, 
the founders’ human capital can proxy for the expected productivity or efficiency of the 
new enterprise.  Banks, venture capitalists, and other capital providers as well as SBIR 
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grant reviewers can use observable characteristics like the founder’s human capital to 
infer about the quality of the business start-up.  I measured human capital by the level of 
education and prior work experience of the start-up’s founders.     
 
4.3.3.3. Technological Capacity 
Technological capacity refers to the ability of the start-up to generate potentially 
commercially useful research.  This is typically measured by prior performance of R&D 
and patent production.  Engaging in R&D is an important innovative activity because it 
increases absorptive capacity.  A firm’s innovation and over-all performance is also a 
function of its ability to scan and exploit the research and innovation of other economic 
actors in the country or abroad to generate new or better products and processes.  For 
example, the compression of hard disk by Seagate, which is very successful 
commercially, was derived from the research on giant magneto resistance by two Nobel 
laureates in physics from France and Germany.  A firm cannot take advantage of the 
innovative ideas of other economic agents without the absorptive capacity to understand 
the basic science and potential commercial application of these ideas.  I measured the 
start-up’s technological capacity with prior performance of R&D and the number of 
patents it owned and/or produced.  Because current technological capacity is a good 
predictor of future innovative activities and outputs, I expect reviewers of SBIR grant 
applications to favor small business start-ups that have engaged in R&D and/or have 
produced intermediate innovation outputs like patents.    
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4.3.3.4. Industry 
The value of R&D and innovation varies from one industry to another.  Thus, new 
technology influences post-entry performance of firms differently.  In terms of program 
selection, I expect SBIR funds of the top five participating agencies (i.e., DOD, DHHS, 
NASA, DOE, and NSF) to accrue disproportionately to small businesses that propose to 
perform R&D in areas aligned with the federal missions and mandates of these agencies.  
Based on Black (2004) and Feldman (1994), I created the following seven categorical 
variables on industrial classification: (1) pharmaceuticals, (2) chemicals, (3) machinery, 
(4) electronics, (5) electrical equipment, (6) medical and surgical equipment, and          
(7) R&D and engineering services with other sectors as the omitted or reference category.  
I expect small business start-ups operating within these seven high-technology sectors to 
have greater propensity to apply and be selected into the SBIR program and better post-
entry performance than their counterparts from traditional sectors.        
 
4.3.3.5. Geographical/Locational Effects 
Finally, geographical context matters in the post-entry performance of small 
business start-ups.  Empirical studies have shown that R&D spillovers are prevalent and 
their magnitude may be quite large.  For example, Jaffe (1986) estimated that firms 
generated on average 0.60 patent per $1 million of R&D expenditure of other firms.  
More specifically, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (2002) found that R&D spillovers 
are localized, i.e., firms from the same state or metropolitan region benefit from each 
other’s innovation.  Knowledge spillovers are localized because knowledge is sticky (von 
Hippel, 1998).  Firms need both explicit and tacit knowledge as they go about thinking of 
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new products and processes that can strengthen their competitive advantage.  Tacit 
knowledge, in contrast to explicit knowledge, lacks extensive codification and thus is not 
easily transferable.  When knowledge is sticky, the degree of difficulty and cost of 
transfer are high.  This is so because learning is not just gaining new information; it is 
more about building new competencies and learning new skills and applications, which 
can be accomplished through “learning-by-interacting” (Lundvall, 1992).  The transfer of 
tacit knowledge is thus higher in states, regions, or local innovation systems where the 
intensity of R&D by firms, universities, and government laboratories is also high.  
Greater R&D intensity also attracts highly skilled technical manpower further improving 
the efficiency of conducting R&D and other innovative activities.  I thus expect start-ups 
that are located in states that spend more in R&D to have greater propensity to develop 
innovative ideas, prepare stronger SBIR research grant proposals, receive SBIR funding, 
and perform better post-entry than their counterparts in states that are less known for their 
R&D activities (e.g. Wyoming and South Dakota).   
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CHAPTER 5 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND THE SBIR PROGRAM 
SELECTION MODEL 
 
Chapter Five presents descriptive statistics and results of the SBIR treatment 
selection model.  The descriptive analysis discusses the characteristics of small business 
start-ups prior to receiving SBIR financing and compares and contrasts the same with that 
of more than 4,000 potential control firms from the KFS sample.  The treatment selection 
analysis using a logistic regression model identifies important characteristics of small 
business start-ups that contributed to successful SBIR application, selection and 
participation.   
 
5.1 The Treated Sample 
Table 5.1 on page 63 presents the baseline characteristics of the 25 SBIR-financed 
small business start-ups using data from the Kauffman Foundation and the Small 
Business Administration.  Most small business start-ups that received R&D grants from 
SBIR had at most one employee when they started operation in 2004.  Only 28 percent of 
recipient start-ups had at least two employees and only one hired more than ten 
employees initially.  The median and mean number of employees of the treated sample 
are one and 1.7 employees respectively.   
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Table 5.1 Baseline Characteristics of Twenty Five SBIR-Financed Small Business 
Start-ups 
 
Baseline Characteristics  
(2004)  
Mean Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation  
Firm Size  
Number of Employees  
 
1.68 
(1.00)  
 
 
0.00 
 
15.00 
 
3.17 
Human Capital  
Post-Graduate Education  
 
Industry Experience  
 
0.80 
 
14.4 
(15.0) 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
30.00 
 
 
0.41 
 
9.24 
Technological Capacity  
Prior R&D Performance  
Number of  Patents  
 
 
Positive Sales  
 
 
0.68  
3.24 
(0.00)  
 
0.65  
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
35.00 
 
 
1.00 
 
0.48 
7.22 
 
 
0.49 
High-Tech Industry 
Pharmaceutical 
Chemicals 
Machinery 
Electronics  
Electrical Equipment  
Medical/Surgical Equipment 
R&D Services  
 
0.08  
0.08 
0.08  
0.24  
0.04  
0.12 
0.28  
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
 
 
0.28 
0.28 
0.28 
0.44 
0.20 
0.33 
0.21 
Geographical Location  
Location in R&D Intensive 
States (e.g. CA, MA) 
 
 
0.80  
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
0.41 
SBA Data 
Minority Ownership 
Women Ownership 
 
0.52 
0.56 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
1.00 
1.00 
 
 
0.51 
0.51 
Note: Statistics in parentheses are median values.   
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Eighty percent of the first owners of SBIR recipients have at least a postgraduate 
degree.  The median is the master’s degree category and the mode is more impressive at 
the doctorate degree category.  See Table 5.2 on page 65.  The owners of recipient start-
ups are not only highly educated but also have vast and extensive industry experience.   
Seventy two percent of owners have at least ten years of experience in the same industry 
as his firm is competing in.  Only one out of 25 owners did not have any industry 
experience.  The mean and median length of industry experience of owners of the treated 
sample are 14.4 and 15 years respectively.  
Seventeen out of 25 (or 68 percent of SBIR recipients) conducted R&D right at 
the start of their operation in 2004.  In terms of intermediate outputs, close to one-half of 
the treated sample already had a patent before the treatment period.  See Table 5.3 on 
page 65.  Ownership of patents indicates that several treated start-ups might have been 
spin-off firms from larger firms or new firms established by academic scientists and 
engineers who had rights to these patents prior to the start-ups’ formation.  Of treated 
start-ups with at least one patent, 83 percent had more than one patent and 25 percent had 
more than five patents.  Three treated start-ups had 8, 11, and 35 patents respectively.  
R&D performance and ownership of patents at the start of business operations can signal 
potential for future innovations.     
Seven SBIR recipient start-ups are operating in R&D and engineering services 
and six are electronics firms.  The other 40 percent are in surgical and medical equipment 
(12 percent), pharmaceuticals (8 percent), chemicals (8 percent), machinery (8 percent), 
and electrical equipment (4 percent).  Other SBIR recipients (8 percent) are in broad 
woven fabric mills and business support services.   
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Table 5.2 Distribution of Level of Education of Owners of SBIR-financed Small 
Business Start-ups  
 
Level of Education Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Bachelor’s Degree 8.00 8.00 
Some Graduate School but No Degree 12.00 20.00 
Master’s Degree 36.00 56.00 
Doctorate or Professional School 44.00 100.00 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Distribution of Volume of Patents of SBIR-financed Small Business Start-
ups in 2004 
 
Number of Patents Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 52.00 52.00 
1 8.00 60.00 
2 8.00 68.00 
3 8.00 76.00 
5 12.00 88.00 
8 4.00 92.00 
11 4.00 96.00 
35 4.00 100.00 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Agency Funding Sources of SBIR-financed Small Business Start-ups  
 
Agency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
DOD only 36.00 36.00 
HHS only 24.00 60.00 
NSF only 12.00 72.00 
DOE only 4.00 76.00 
USDA only 4.00 80.00 
DOD and NSF 12.00 92.00 
HHS and NSF 4.00 96.00 
DOD, HHS and NSF 4.00 100.00 
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Twenty SBIR recipients (or 80 percent of the entire treated sample) located their 
businesses in R&D intensive states.  Twenty one (or 84 percent) are located in 
metropolitan or urban areas.                 
Using data from the Small Business Administration, I will also describe the 25 
treated firms in terms of their funding agencies and minority and gender ownerships.  
Twenty SBIR recipients received funding from a single agency, four from two agencies, 
and one from three agencies.  For single-agency SBIR recipients, nine received SBIR 
R&D grants from the Department of Defense (DoD), six from the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), three from the National Science Foundation (NSF), and one 
each from the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA).  
Three recipient start-ups received funding from both DOD and NSF and a fourth start-up 
obtained the R&D subsidy from both the NSF and HHS.  The lone treated start-up with 
three agency sources of funding received grants from the DOD, HHS, and NSF.  Fifty-
two percent of the treated start-ups are minority-owned (i.e., at least one of the owners is 
non-White) and fifty-six percent are women-owned (i.e., at least one of the owners is a 
woman).   
In summary, this analysis not only provides a descriptive account of the types of 
small business start-ups that received SBIR R&D subsidies, it also suggests areas to 
which the study’s empirical findings can be generalized.  The univariate descriptive 
analysis of SBIR recipients suggests that the study’s empirical findings (i.e., the SBIR 
program selection analysis and the treatment effects analysis) may be limited to start-ups 
that operate in electronics, R&D and engineering services, medical and surgical 
equipment, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and electrical equipment and to start-ups that 
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conduct industrial R&D associated with the agency missions and focus research areas of 
the DOD, HHS, NSF, and to a limited extent that of the DOE and USDA.     
 
5.2 Comparison of the Treated Sample and Potential Controls 
As Table 5.5 on page 68 shows, untreated small business start-ups (that can 
potentially serve as controls in the treatment effects analyses) differ in a lot of ways from 
the twenty five start-ups that received SBIR financing in 2007-08.   
In terms of human capital, the recipient or treated sample is four times more likely 
than the untreated sample to have owners with a postgraduate education or training.  
Moreover, the owner-entrepreneurs of SBIR recipients had longer experience in the 
industry where the start-up is operating and competing.  Graduate training (whether it be 
a research degree in science and engineering or a professional degree like an MBA) and 
prior industry experience of the entrepreneur or primary owner are measures of 
capabilities that help in sensing and seizing opportunities from new technologies, product 
prototypes, or new services.   
Recipient small business start-ups also have a significant initial advantage in 
technological capacity.  SBIR-financed start-ups are more than three times more likely to 
conduct R&D than the untreated group.  Start-ups that received R&D subsidies also had 
been more productive generating intermediate innovation outputs, specifically patents.  
On average, treated start-ups have more than three patents at the end of 2004, while a 
majority of the potential controls did not produce or at least purchase a license for a 
patent.   
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Table 5.5 Baseline Characteristics by Treatment Status 
 
Baseline Characteristics  
(2004)  
Potential 
Controls 
(n=4,000+) 
Treated 
Small 
Business 
Start-ups 
(n=25) 
Difference p-value  
Firm Size  
Number of Employees  
 
1.94 
  
 
1.68  
 
0.26 
 
0.840  
Human Capital  
Post-Graduate Education  
Industry Experience  
 
0.20  
0.55  
 
0.80  
0.72  
 
-0.60 
-0.17 
 
0.000  
0.095  
Technological Capacity  
Prior R&D Performance  
Number of  Patents  
Positive Sales  
 
0.21  
0.15  
0.91  
 
0.68  
3.24  
0.65  
 
-0.47 
-3.09 
0.26 
 
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
High-Tech Industry 
Pharmaceutical 
Chemicals 
Machinery 
Electronics  
Electrical Equipment  
Medical/Surgical Equipment 
R&D Services  
 
0.01 
0.02 
0.04 
0.04 
0.01 
0.002 
0.20  
 
0.08  
0.08 
0.08  
0.24  
0.04  
0.12 
0.28  
 
-0.07 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.20 
-0.03 
-0.118 
-0.08 
 
 
0.000  
0.014 
0.350  
0.000  
0.204  
0.020 
0.346  
Geographical Location  
Location in R&D Intensive 
States (e.g. CA, MA)  
 
0.84  
 
0.80  
 
0.04 
 
0.594  
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A significantly larger proportion of SBIR-backed start-ups are in the fields of 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electronics, and medical/surgical equipment.  A larger 
percentage of treated start-ups are also operating in other high-tech areas like machinery, 
electrical equipment, and R&D and engineering services, but the differences in 
proportions between recipient and non-recipient start-ups are not significantly different 
from zero.    
Untreated start-ups, in contrast, have an advantage over SBIR recipients in 
employment size, sales performance, and location in R&D intensive states.  Ninety one 
percent of the potential controls sold goods and/or services in 2005 compared to only 65 
percent of SBIR-financed small business start-ups.  The 25 percentage point advantage of 
untreated start-ups over their treated counterparts is statistically significant (p<0.001).  
However, the same cannot be said of firm size and location advantages of non-recipient 
start-ups.   On average, untreated and treated start-up had 1.9 and 1.7 employees in their 
initial year of operation, but this difference is both substantively and statistically 
negligible (p<0.85).  The potential controls are four percentage points more likely to 
locate their operations in top R&D performing states like California and Massachusetts 
than did SBIR recipients, but this difference is also not statistically significant (p<0.60).  
We cannot rule out the possibility that such difference across treatment status is due to 
random chance.        
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5.3 SBIR Treatment Selection Analysis 
This section identifies the most important firm-level characteristics that contribute 
to successful application and selection into the SBIR program.  The analysis is interesting 
for many reasons, chief of which is the fact that the program selection model involves 
small firms that were new to the industry at that time and thus had no prior track record 
or established reputation to stand on.  A track record of success (or at least a strong 
indication of potential to succeed) is important in securing scarce R&D resources.  Table 
5.6 on page 72 shows the empirical results of the treatment selection analysis, reporting 
logit coefficients as well as unstandardized and standardized odds ratios.     
In the sample, employment size has a negative effect on the probabilities of being 
awarded an SBIR grant in 2007-08.  Start-ups with more employees are less likely to be 
selected into the SBIR program.  The estimated standard error, however, is too large to 
generalize such a conclusion from the sample back to the larger population from which 
the KFS sample was drawn.  The same is true for the industry experience of the 
owners/entrepreneurs: it had the expected sign but the estimated logit coefficient is also 
not statistically significant.  The estimate of its impact or effect is less than two standard 
errors from zero, indicating that random chance or variation cannot be ruled out as an 
explanation for the difference in the likelihood of being awarded an SBIR subsidy 
between start-ups that have owners with at least 10 years of industry experience and those 
that do not, all things being equal.  It is possible that this type of human capital of small 
business start-ups do not have an effect on the odds and probabilities of receiving an 
SBIR award.   
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The level of education of the start-ups’ owners has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of receiving an SBIR subsidy.  The odds that a start-up whose owner has a 
postgraduate degree or training will receive an SBIR grant are 7.3 times as high as the 
odds of a start-up without an owner with such advanced academic training, all things 
being equal.  Conducting R&D at the start of operations also predicts a start-up’s 
selection into the SBIR program.  A start-up’s odds of receiving SBIR if it performed 
prior R&D are 3.6 times as high as the odds of a non-R&D performing start-up, holding 
the other variables in the selection model constant.  The number of patents a start-up 
possessed at the initial year of operation also positively impacts the likelihood of being 
granted an R&D subsidy from the SBIR program.  As the number of patents rises by one, 
the odds of receiving an SBIR award rises by 4 percent, ceteris paribus.  
SBIR selection is also a function of the type of industry where the start-up operates and 
competes.  As expected most industries that are classified as high-tech have a significant 
advantage in securing SBIR funds over traditional sectors like agriculture and mining and 
the services sector like education and banking and finance.  The odds of a start-up 
operating in the pharmaceuticals, chemicals, machinery, electronic, electrical equipment, 
and medical/surgical equipment industries of receiving an SBIR grant respectively are 
26.5, 27.3, 15.4, 25.6, 20.6 and 186.5 times as high as the odds of a start-up in the low-
technology sector.  The differences in the odds of six high-tech sectors and the traditional 
sectors, which is the omitted category, are all significant at the 5 percent level.  In 
contrast, start-ups in R&D and engineering services have no significant odds advantage 
in securing SBIR subsidy over traditional and service sectors.   
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Table 5.6 SBIR Program or Treatment Selection Model 
 
Variables  Logit 
Coefficient 
(b) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(e
b
) 
Standardized 
Odds Ratio 
(e
bStdX
) 
Z-statistics p-value  
Firm Size  
Number of Employees  
 
-0.03 
 
0.97 
 
1.20 
 
-0.48 
(0.068) 
 
0.634 
Human Capital  
Post-Graduate Education  
 
Industry Experience  
 
1.99 
 
0.22 
 
7.33 
 
1.24 
 
2.27 
 
1.11 
 
3.63 
(0.549) 
0.43 
(0.507) 
 
0.000 
 
0.667 
Technological Capacity  
Prior R&D Performance  
 
Number of  Patents  
 
Positive Sales  
 
1.28 
 
0.04 
 
-1.15 
 
3.60 
 
1.04 
 
0.32 
 
1.70 
 
1.10 
 
1.38 
 
2.53 
(0.506) 
1.87 
(0.088) 
-2.23 
(0.518) 
 
0.011 
 
0.061 
 
0.026 
High-Tech Industry 
Pharmaceutical 
 
Chemicals 
 
Machinery 
 
Electronics  
 
Electrical Equipment  
 
Medical/Surgical Equipment 
 
R&D Services  
 
3.28 
 
3.31 
 
2.74 
 
3.24 
 
3.02 
 
5.23 
 
1.38 
 
26.51 
 
27.27 
 
15.45 
 
25.64 
 
20.55 
 
186.51 
 
3.98 
 
1.33 
 
1.50 
 
1.73 
 
1.82 
 
1.40 
 
1.30 
 
1.75 
 
3.03 
(1.081) 
3.12 
(1.059) 
2.51 
(1.091) 
3.74 
(0.808) 
2.38 
(1.271) 
4.57 
(1.144) 
1.60 
(0.861) 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.012 
 
0.000 
 
0.017 
 
0.000 
 
0.109 
Geographical Location  
Location in R&D Intensive 
States (e.g. CA, MA)  
 
-1.00 
 
0.37 
 
1.44 
 
-1.77 
(0.564) 
 
0.077 
N=3,886, LR =103.49, Prob>LR=0.000.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
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Geographical location is statistically significant at the less restrictive 10 percent 
level.
30
  The odds of a start-up that is located in R&D intensive states like California and 
Massachusetts receiving an SBIR grant are only 0.37 times as high as the odds of a start-
up operating in states that conduct less R&D.  This result may provide empirical evidence 
for the distributional function of the SBIR program.  SBIR R&D subsidy grants are more 
likely to be distributed to small business start-ups that lack the advantage of knowledge 
spillovers from intense research and development activities of universities, research 
laboratories, and firms within their respective local innovation systems.            
Using standardized odds ratios, the postgraduate education of the start-ups’ 
owners has the strongest impact on the odds of being selected into the SBIR program, 
followed by operating in the electronics sector.  Among covariates with significant logit 
coefficients, the number of patents that a start-up possessed prior to application appears 
to have the weakest impact; a one standard deviation increase in the volume of patents 
increases the odds of receiving SBIR only by 10 percent.  Having sales, on the other 
hand, decreases the odds of being granted an SBIR subsidy by 38 percent.   
Before I discuss the effect of covariates on the probabilities of being selected into 
the SBIR program, a digression into a few fundamental assumptions of the logistic 
regression model may be in order.  The logistic regression model estimated by maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE), in contrast to the linear probability model (LPM) estimated 
by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), assumes a nonlinear and non-additive effect of the 
                                                 
 
 
30
 Assuming the null hypothesis, there is one out of ten chance of concluding that the odds advantages are 
real when in fact there are no differences between the odds and probabilities of receiving SBIR funds 
between the two geographical locations in the larger population, holding the rest of the variables in the 
selection model constant.   
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explanatory variables on the probability of receiving an SBIR grant.  LPM’s linearity 
assumption means that a one-unit change in one of the covariates, say X1, has a constant 
marginal effect on the predicted probabilities of the dichotomous outcome variable.  A 
nonlinear assumption that the effect of Xk on predicted probabilities would be larger near 
the floor or ceiling than near the middle makes more theoretical sense.  In a model 
explaining selection into the SBIR program, it is more reasonable to assume that an 
increase in patents from 3 to 4 will have a smaller impact on predicted probabilities of 
SBIR participation than an increase in patents from 0 to 1 or 34 to 35.  LPM’s additivity 
assumption means that the predicted values of the dichotomous outcome variable depend 
on the sum of the marginal effects of all explanatory variables from X1, X2 to Xk.
31
  A 
non-additive assumption also make much more theoretical sense because it seems more 
likely that if one of the explanatory variables (say X1) has reached a sufficiently high 
level to push the predicted probability near 0 or 1, the effects of other covariates from X2 
to Xk cannot have much influence.  In the SBIR selection model, if the number of patents 
reaches a sufficiently high level, it is very reasonable to assume that the other Xs will 
have little influence on predicted probabilities of SBIR selection.  This is the same as 
saying that the effect of Xk on predicted probabilities depend on the prior values of Xk. 
Because the effect on probabilities from a one-unit increase in Xk is nonlinear and 
non-additive, there are multiple ways of presenting probabilities changes in logistic 
regression analysis.  Most of these methods calculate probability changes as Xk increases 
by one-unit while holding the rest of the variables in the model constant at their means 
                                                 
 
 
31
 At extreme values of the Xs, LPM’s additivity assumption may force predicted probabilities above 1 or 
below 0, outside the range of a probability.   
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(Lewis, 2012).  Since most of the explanatory variables in the SBIR selection model are 
dichotomous or a group of dummy variables, it is not meaningful to hold these variables 
at their means.  Instead, I chose a base start-up, calculated its predicted probability of 
being selected into the SBIR program, and changed one or more variables at a time.  The 
base start-up is a small firm that is owned by an individual with advanced postgraduate 
training, performed R&D at the initial year of operation, had three patents in the same 
period, and is operating or competing in the electronics sector.  The predicted probability 
of this start-up is 21.0 percent.  The predicted probability of a start-up with the same set 
of characteristics but without an owner who has an advanced academic training is 3.5 
percent or a drop of 17.5 percentage points.  A start-up with the same set of 
characteristics but did not perform R&D only has a 6.9 percent chance of being awarded 
an SBIR subsidy or a decrease in probability by 14.1 percentage points.  A start-up that 
differs with the base start-up only on the fact that it operates in the low-technology sector 
has a predicted probability of only 0.6 percent or a drop of 20.4 percentage points.  These 
effects on probability changes are consistent with the effects on the odds of being 
selected into the SBIR program.   
In addition to the tests of single coefficients using the Wald test, I also performed 
a significance tests for three groups of variables.  See Table 5.7 on page 76.  The test of 
human capital variables indicates that these variables are jointly significant at the 0.01 
level.  We have sufficient evidence from the sample data that not all human capital 
variables (i.e., education of owner, industry experience of owner, and number of 
employees) have zero effect on the odds and probabilities of receiving SBIR award.  The 
same can be said of the technological capacity variables (i.e., prior performance of R&D, 
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volume of patents, and sales).  Finally, the seven industrial dummies are jointly 
significant; at least one of the high-tech sectors have a differential effect on the odds and 
probabilities of SBIR selection relative to that of the traditional sector and the service 
sector. 
The likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that all the variables included 
in the logistic regression model have no effect on SBIR selection.  See Table 5.6 on page 
72.   
   
Table 5.7 Significance Tests of Groups of Covariates 
Groups of Variables Degree of 
Freedom 
LR Chi-square 
statistics (χ2*) 
Prob>χ2* 
Human Capital Variables including 
Number of Employees 
3 13.78 0.003 
Technological Capacity Variables 3 15.25 0.002 
Industrial Classification Dummy 
Variables 
7 31.94 0.000 
Note: The null hypothesis is the logit coefficients of the variables are simultaneously 
zero.   
  
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
Financially successful start-ups are significantly different from the typical or 
average start-up (Shane, 2008 ).  The application for public financing for R&D 
specifically SBIR grants tells the same story:  those who applied for and were eventually 
granted with SBIR funds are significantly different from the typical start-up that started 
operation in 2004.   
As expected, the training and education (p<0.001) of owners of small business 
start-ups significantly predict SBIR selection.  As previously discussed in more detail in 
the previous chapter, the education of the entrepreneurs captures the cognitive ability to 
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sense and seize technological opportunities that others may fail to perceive as both 
technically feasible and commercially promising.  These promising technology research 
areas are pursued and proposed by highly educated entrepreneurs and are also more likely 
to have been judged technically and commercially sound by grant reviewers of SBIR 
participating agencies.  Because the breadth of one’s training and education can increase 
the ability to combine unrelated concepts to create something that consumers value, it is 
thus plausible that highly educated entrepreneurs are more creative, more sophisticated in 
packaging R&D grant proposals, more technically savvy in pointing to the technological 
gaps that their proposed R&D will fill, and thus, tend to be more successful in SBIR 
application and selection.  Secondly, the entrepreneur’s advanced level of education can 
also serve as proxy for the extent of his or her network in the scientific or academic 
community.  The priority research areas of SBIR participating agencies are not created in 
a vacuum; they consider technical inputs from academic scientists and engineers as well 
as entrepreneurs in the high-technology business sector.  Highly educated entrepreneurs 
are more likely to interact with this network of scholars/researchers and high-technology 
entrepreneurs, and thus, may be more likely to spot opportunities within current priority 
SBIR research areas.  For entrepreneurs who used to be a member of the academic and 
scientific community (as Ph.D. students and/or university professors/researchers), it is 
plausible that they may have directly or indirectly provided inputs to SBIR research 
areas.  
As also expected, performing R&D (p<0.05) and owning knowledge assets, 
specifically patents (p<0.10), increase the likelihood of receiving SBIR grants.  There are 
at least two reasons for this empirical result: internal and external.  First, those who 
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perform R&D are more likely to sense technological dead-ends, and thus, are more likely 
to propose technologically sound SBIR proposals.  This ability to separate technically 
promising areas from technological dead-ends, which can be acquired by performing 
R&D right at the start of business operations, increases the probability of SBIR funding.  
The external reason has something to do with the reputation of the proponent small firm.  
Reviewers of SBIR grant applications are more likely to favor proponents who have 
engaged in R&D, believing that R&D experience increases the firm’s absorptive 
capacity, which enhance success in producing innovations from R&D grants.  In addition 
to indicating successful innovation record, owning patents may further encourage firms to 
apply for R&D grants.  Because innovation is highly complex, that is, it might take a 
combination of multiple patents to produce a product, process, or service that consumers 
value, it is plausible that patent-owning start-ups are thinking of generating new patents 
(out of the public R&D grant), which they will combine with what they currently own to 
generate innovation.  In sum, patent owners are more likely to sense they need a portfolio 
of knowledge assets to produce innovation, and thus, are more likely to exploit external 
R&D resources (e.g. SBIR grants) in order to be more successful in orchestrating inputs 
for innovation.   
The industry where the start-up chose to compete or operate significantly predicts 
the probability of SBIR participation.  The odds of receiving SBIR funds of small 
business start-ups in the pharmaceutical (p<0.01), chemical (p<0.01), machinery 
(p<0.05), electronics (p<0.001), electrical equipment (p<0.05), and medical and surgical 
equipment (p<0.001) are at least 15 times as high as the odds of those in the traditional 
sectors including the services sector.  Of course, this empirical result is hardly surprising.  
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The goal of the SBIR is to stimulate technological innovation, specifically along the 
mission areas of the 11 participating SBIR agencies.  The seven high-tech industries are 
more likely to correspond with the federal missions and mandates of at least the top five 
SBIR agencies: DOD, HHS/NIH, NASA, DOE, and NSF.  Ninety-six percent (i.e., 24 out 
of 25) of SBIR recipient small business start-ups obtained their SBIR R&D funding 
either from the DOD, HHS/NIH, NSF and DOE or a combination of these.  
The hypothesis that firm size (p<0.70) positively contributes to SBIR selection is 
not supported.  A possible reason is that basic technology research by start-ups is owner-
specific.  The quality of SBIR grant proposals may depend on the owner-entrepreneur 
more than his or her own employees.  The industry experience (p<0.70) of the owner, 
however, does not matter in SBIR selection.  While we hypothesized that more 
experienced entrepreneurs were more likely to bring with them best-practice 
organizational routines that are important in running day-to-day operations including 
R&D, these routines may not be that important in developing quality proposals and 
therefore in obtaining SBIR awards.  Surprisingly, start-ups without sales (p<0.05) are 
more likely to receive SBIR awards.  I can proffer at least two explanations.  First, start-
ups that are looking at long-term R&D as their source of future competitive advantage are 
more likely to forego production and sales in favor of more R&D.  Second, small firms 
without any short-term inclination or plan to sell goods and services are being created by 
opportunistic entrepreneurs just for the sole purpose of securing SBIR funds.  These two 
explanations/hypotheses can be tested in future research on SBIR recipient firms. 
Finally, there is some evidence that geographical location (p<0.10) matters, but 
surprisingly, it works at the opposite direction, that is, start-ups in states that are known 
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for R&D and innovative activities are less likely to receive SBIR grants.  The literature 
on knowledge and technological spillovers (Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2002) predicts that the 
innovating firm benefits from the R&D conducted by universities, government research 
laboratories, and other firms within its local innovation system.  These spillovers will 
enhance the quality of firms’ R&D including their proposal for public R&D grants.  It 
appears that a different mechanism might be at play here.  First, start-ups in less R&D 
intensive locations may correctly perceive that they are at a disadvantage (due to less 
technological spillovers) and decide to conduct more R&D on their own with the help of 
federal R&D grants.  Thus, it is plausible that start-ups at less R&D intensive states are 
more likely to apply for SBIR grant in order to conduct R&D on their own instead of 
relying on research spillovers, which may or may not come (Feldman, 1994).  Second, 
SBIR participating agencies may also sense that small firms in locations with few 
technological spillovers are at a disadvantage and may decide to distribute SBIR awards 
evenly between R&D intensive states (e.g. CA and MA) and those that are not well 
known for their R&D activities, without having to sacrifice the quality of funded SBIR 
R&D projects.  The empirical finding that SBIR funding (at least for small business start-
ups) are geographically distributed or dispersed is important.  It can offer a political 
explanation why the SBIR continues as a federal technology program while others like 
the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) have been terminated.  Start-ups from states 
(e.g. Wyoming and South Dakota) that are not known for their R&D may also benefit 
from the SBIR program.
32
  Specifically for the KFS-SBA dataset, start-ups from Utah, 
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 South Dakota and Wyoming, ranked 50
th
 and 51
st
 in R&D performance respectively, spent only $149 
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Vermont, South Carolina, and Montana also received SBIR funding.
33
  Elected political 
representatives in the U.S. Congress are more likely to support public programs that 
benefit their respective constituencies.          
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
million and $98 million in 2004.  In contrast, California spent $59.6 billion in R&D in the same period.     
33
 Montana is ranked 48
th
 in R&D performance, spending only $295 million in 2004.  The 25
th
 ranked state, 
Missouri, spent $ 3 billion in R&D in the same period.    
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CHAPTER 6 
TREATMENT EFFECT ON POST-ENTRY PERFORMANCE 
 
Chapter Six discusses the empirical evidence on the treatment effect of the SBIR 
program on the innovation effort, external capital infusion, and other metrics of post-
entry performance like sales and employment size of small business start-ups.   
 
6.1       Outcome Variables by Treatment Status 
Table 6.1 on page 84 presents statistics on binary outcome variables by treatment 
status.  Except for two variables (i.e., borrowing from banks and licensing out of patents 
in 2009), all differences in proportions with respect to relevant outcome variables 
between treated and untreated small business start-ups are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.   
While SBIR recipients are 9.2 percentage points more likely to license out a 
patent in 2009 than non-recipients, the difference is not significant at the 5 percent level.  
Table 6.3 on page 86 shows the ratio of the odds of licensing out a patent between 
recipient and non-recipient start-ups, which is also not statistically significant.  Treated 
and untreated start-ups are also equally likely to borrow from banks in 2009, one year 
after the treatment period (odds ratio =0.95, p<0.97).   
Focusing only on outcome variables that are significantly different across 
treatment status, Tables 6.2.1 to 6.2.4 on pages 85-86 present two-way contingency table 
analyses of the relationship or association between receiving SBIR funding and (a) R&D 
performance in 2008; (b) innovation propensity in 2009; (c) licensing-in of patents in 
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2009; and (d) loan borrowings from government agencies in 2009.   Table 6.3 on page 86 
also provides the odds advantages of SBIR recipients over non-recipients on the same set 
of outcome variables.   
With a gamma statistic of 0.95, receiving SBIR grant and the performance of 
R&D in 2008 are strongly positively related.  SBIR grantees are 72.6 percentage points 
more likely to engage in R&D in 2008 than non-recipients (p<0.001).  The introduction 
of innovation in 2009 and receiving SBIR in 2007-08 are also strongly positively related 
in the sample (gamma=0.80).  The odds that a SBIR grantee introduced an innovation in 
2009 were more than nine times as high as the odds of a non-grantee (p<0.001).  
Interestingly, SBIR recipients were 24.7 percentage points more likely to license in a 
patent in 2009 than did non-recipients (p<0.001).  The positive association between the 
two variables is strong with a gamma statistic of 0.91.  Finally, the odds of the treated 
group borrowing from government agencies was almost 20 times as high as the odds of 
the untreated group (p<0.01).   
Table 6.4 on page 86 presents tests of differences in interval-level outcome 
variables between treated start-ups and the potential control group.  On average, the 
treated subsample spent $691,623 in R&D in 2008 while the potential control group spent 
only $18,490.  This difference is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level.  In terms 
of intermediate innovation outputs, SBIR recipients had, on average, about a four patent 
advantage over non-grantees in 2009, and this difference is also statistically significant at 
the 0.1 percent level.  In terms of firm size, non-recipients had grown to about four 
employees in 2009 while recipients to nine employees, on average.  The five-employee 
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advantage in 2009 of the treated group over the potential control group is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level.     
 
Table 6.1 Binary Outcome Variables by Treatment Status before Matching 
Outcome Variables      
(2008-09) 
Potential 
Controls 
Treated Difference 
in 
Proportions 
z statistic p-
value 
R&D Performance  0.169 0.895 -0.726 -8.303 0.000 
Introduction of Innovation  0.142 0.600 -0.458 -5.819 0.000 
 
Licensing- out of Patents  
 
0.096 
 
0.188 
 
-0.092 
 
-1.09 
 
0.138 
 
Licensing- in of Patents in 
2009  
 
0.016 
 
0.263 
 
-0.247 
 
-8.147 
 
0.000 
 
External Capital  from Family, 
Friends, Other Individuals in 
2009  
 
0.041 
 
0.000 
 
 0.041 
 
 0.803 
 
0.789 
 
External Capital from 
Government Agencies in 2009  
 
0.003 
 
0.056 
 
-0.053 
 
-3.86 
 
0.000 
 
External Capital from Banks in 
2009 
 
0.058 
 
0.056 
 
0.002 
 
0.045 
 
0.518 
 
External Capital from Gov’t, 
Banks and Other Financial 
institutions 
 
0.070 
 
0.167 
 
-0.097 
 
-1.592 
 
0.056 
 
External Capital from All 
Sources in 2008  
 
0.147 
 
0.176 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.346 
 
0.364 
 
External Capital from All 
Sources in 2009 
 
 
0.154 
 
0.200 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.491 
 
0.312 
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Table 6.2.1  R&D Performance in 2008 by Treatment Status 
 
Treatment Status 
Total 
0  
Non-
recipients 
1  
SBIR 
Recipients 
R&D 
Performance in 
2008 
0 No Column Percentage 83.1% 10.5% 82.6% 
    
1 Yes Column Percentage 16.9% 89.5% 17.4% 
    
Total Column Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    
γ=0.9532; chi-square statistic = 68.94, p<0.000  
 
Table 6.2.2  Innovation Propensity in 2009 by Treatment Status 
 
Treatment Status 
Total 
0  
Non-
recipients 
1  
SBIR 
Recipients 
Introduction of 
Innovation in 
2009 
0 No Column Percentage 85.8% 40.0% 85.6% 
    
1 Yes Column Percentage 14.2% 60.0% 14.4% 
    
Total Column Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    
γ =0.801, χ2 statistic = 33.86, p<0.000  
 
  
Table 6.2.3  Licensing-in of Patents in 2009 by Treatment Status 
 
Treatment Status 
Total 
0  
Non-
recipients 
1  
SBIR 
Recipients 
License-out 
Patents in 2009 
0 No Column Percentage 98.4% 73.7% 98.2% 
    
1 Yes Column Percentage 1.6% 26.3% 1.8% 
    
Total Column Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    
γ =0.9142, χ2statistic = 66.38, p<0.000  
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Table 6.2.4  Borrowing from Government Agencies in 2009 by Treatment Status 
 
Treatment Status 
Total 
0  
Non-
recipients 
1  
SBIR 
Recipients 
Borrow from 
Government 
Agencies in 2009 
0 No Column Percentage 99.7% 94.4% 99.7% 
    
1 Yes Column Percentage 0.3% 5.6% 0.3% 
    
Total Column Percentage 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    
γ =0.90, χ2 statistic = 14.88, p<0.000; p<0.06 (Fisher’s exact test)  
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Odds Ratio by Treatment Status 
Outcome Variables     (2008-09) Odds 
Ratio 
z statistic p-value 
R&D Performance  41.7 4.98 
 
0.000 
Introduction of Innovation  9.05 4.81 0.000 
Licensing- out of Patents  2.18 1.07 0.286 
Licensing- in of Patents  22.3 5.69 0.000 
External Capital from 
Government Agencies  
19.95 2.73 0.006 
External Capital from Banks 0.95 -0.05 0.964 
External Capital from Gov’t, 
Banks and Other Financial 
institutions 
2.65 1.53 0.126 
External Capital in 2008  1.25 0.35 0.730 
External Capital in 2009 1.37 0.49 0.625 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Interval-level Outcome Variables by Treatment Status 
Outcome Variables  
(2008-09) 
Untreated Treated Difference 
in Means 
t 
statistic 
p-
value 
R&D Expenditure in 2008  18,490.4 691,622.6 - 671,132.2 -10.71 0.000 
Number of Employees in 2009 3.93 9.05 -5.12 -1.82 0.035 
Number of Patents in 2009  3.19 7.07 -3.87 -3.41 0.001 
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6.2       Propensity Score Matching 
The bivariate descriptive and inferential analyses using contingency tables and 
test of differences in proportions and means between treated and untreated small business 
start-ups through chi-square, z, and t tests are not rigorous because antecedent variables 
that may covary with both treatment status and relevant outcome variables like R&D 
expenditures and innovation propensities have not been controlled for.  As shown in 
Table 5.5 on page 68, treated and untreated small business start-ups significantly differed 
in baseline characteristics that can potentially confound the relationship between 
treatment status and outcome variables.   
I controlled for potential confounders through propensity score matching.  I 
predicted the propensity score (or probability of treatment selection) of all small business 
start-ups in the KFS sample and match SBIR recipients with non-recipients with the 
nearest propensity scores using the nearest-neighbor matching algorithm.  The propensity 
score model or treatment selection model fits the data well (likelihood ratio χ2= 103.49, 
p<0.001). 
More than 4,000 start-ups that did not receive SBIR funding are matched with the 
treated subsample.  Consistent with the propensity score theorem (Pearl, 2009), units with 
identical or nearly identical propensity scores have, on average, the same distribution of 
covariates, which in this case, are antecedent variables that confound the relationship 
between receiving SBIR subsidy and firm-level outcomes.  Table 6.5 on page 88 presents 
the test of differences in means and proportions of these explanatory variables.  The null 
hypotheses cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level indicating that the distributions of 
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human capital, technological capacity, geographical location, and industrial classification 
are not significantly different across treatment status.        
 
Table 6.5 Difference in Means of Covariate after Matching 
 
Baseline Characteristics  
(2004)  
Matched 
Comparison 
Group 
Treated 
Small 
Business 
Start-ups  
Difference p-value  
Firm Size  
Number of Employees  
 
1.25 
  
 
1.17  
 
0.08 
 
0.891  
Human Capital  
Post-Graduate Education  
Industry Experience  
 
0.68  
0.82  
 
0.83  
0.72  
 
-0.15 
0.10 
 
0.219  
0.394  
 
Technological Capacity  
Prior R&D Performance  
Number of  Patents  
Positive Sales  
 
0.53  
1.96  
0.65  
 
0.61  
1.94  
0.72  
 
-0.08 
0.02 
-0.07 
 
0.529  
0.995  
0.566  
 
High-Tech Industry 
Pharmaceutical 
Chemicals 
Machinery 
Electronics  
Electrical Equipment  
Medical/Surgical Equipment 
R&D Services  
 
0.11 
0.07 
0.07 
0.21 
0.11 
0.05 
0.19  
 
0.06  
0.11 
0.06  
0.22  
0.06  
0.11 
0.28  
 
0.05 
-0.04 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.05 
-0.06 
0.09 
 
0.527  
0.577 
0.828  
0.916  
0.527  
0.386 
0.444  
 
Geographical Location  
Location in R&D Intensive 
States (e.g. CA, MA)  
 
 
0.74  
 
0.72  
 
0.02 
 
0.903  
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6.3       Treatment Effects Estimates 
Tables 6.6.1 and 6.6.2.on pages 91-92 present the results of the treatment effects 
analyses.  For comparison purposes, the analyses provide three treatment effect estimates: 
(1) estimate from the naïve estimator, derived as the difference in group means between 
SBIR recipients and all potential controls; (2) estimate from propensity score matching, 
which is the difference in group means between SBIR recipients and their well-matched 
non-recipient counterparts; and (3) estimate from OLS regression within common 
support, i.e., the estimate from fitting a least squares regression using only data from the 
homogenous sample of recipient start-ups and their observationally similar non-recipient 
counterparts.   
The size of the treated and matched comparison subsamples differ from one 
model to another.  For example, Model I has a total of 75 observations while Model VI 
only includes 72 cases.  As discussed in the methods and data chapters, treatment effect 
analyses through PSM drop treated or untreated observations whose propensity scores are 
off common support.  All cases with missing values in a particular variable are also 
excluded from the estimation of the ATT.  For example, in Model I, one treated 
observation was dropped from the analysis because it is off common support (i.e., PSM 
did not find any counterfactual for this SBIR recipient firm), six had missing values in the 
outcome variable and any of the covariates balanced in the SBIR selection model and 
thus were also excluded, and only 57 untreated cases have the same covariate distribution 
as the 18 treated cases retained in the analysis.        
As expected, SBIR recipients are more likely to perform R&D in 2008 than 
observationally-similar start-ups that did not obtain an SBIR R&D subsidy.  Focusing on 
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the PSM estimator, 19 out of 57 matched non-recipients (or 33 percent) performed R&D 
in 2008 compared to almost 89 percent of SBIR recipients.  This 56 percentage point 
difference in the probability of small business start-ups to conduct R&D in 2008 is 
statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level.  The odds of an SBIR recipient 
performing R&D in 2008 is 16 times as high as the odds of a non-recipient (p<0.001), 
holding constant human capital, technological capacity, geographical location, and 
industrial classification.  The OLS estimate of the same probability difference is close at 
49 percentage points (p<0.001). 
How much is the actual R&D expenditure advantage of treated start-ups?  
Without propensity score matching, the estimate of the advantage is $672,092 (p<0.001).  
After balancing the covariates, the treatment effect estimate is reduced to $477,900, but it 
remains statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  On average, SBIR recipient start-
ups spent $663,379 while their observationally similar non-recipient counterparts spent 
only $185,479.  See Figure 6.1 on page 92.  The OLS estimate of the R&D expenditure 
advantage of SBIR recipients over non-recipients is slightly smaller at $442,412 
(p<0.05).  In Model III in which the outcome variable is the natural logarithm of the total 
R&D expenditure in 2008, SBIR recipient start-ups spent at least 234 percent more in 
R&D than their observationally similar non-recipient counterparts.     
SBIR recipients also have a decisive advantage over their observationally-similar non-
recipient counterparts in the introduction of product and process innovations in 2009.   
PSM and OLS estimate that SBIR-financed start-ups are 33 and 39 percentage points 
respectively more likely to introduce innovation in 2009 than start-ups not supported by 
the R&D subsidy program for small businesses (p< 0.01).  The odds of the treated 
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subsample in introducing innovation are about four times as high as the odds of the 
matched untreated subsample.  
 
Table 6.6.1 Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) Estimates: R& D and Innovation 
 
 
Models Outcome 
Variable 
Treated 
Subsample  
Matched 
Untreated 
Subsample  
Total 
Sample 
Size 
Treatment Effect Estimate 
Naïve 
Estimator 
PSM 
Estimator 
Regression 
within 
Common 
Support 
Model I R&D 
Performance in 
2008 
 
18 57  75  0.73***  
(8.57)  
0.56*** 
(4.80)  
0.49***  
(5.15)  
Model II R&D 
Expenditure in 
2008 
18 57  75  672,092***  
(10.31)  
477,900* 
(2.00)  
442,412*  
(1.97)  
Model III Log R&D 
Expenditure in 
2008 
 
12 35  47  3.56***  
(6.73)  
2.55***  
(3.74)  
2.34**  
(3.36)  
Model IV Innovation 
Propensity in 
2009  
 
18 49  67  0.47***  
(5.51)  
0.33* 
(2.18)  
0.39* 
(2.36)  
Model V Licensing-out 
of Patents 
 
13 26 39 0.09 
(0.098) 
0.19+ 
(1.46) 
0.16 
(1.25) 
Model VI Licensing-in of 
Patents 
 
18 54 72 0.25*** 
(8.36) 
0.22* 
(2.20) 
0.16* 
(1.72) 
Model 
VII 
 
Patent Size 11 17 28 3.98** 
(3.38) 
1.34 
(0.75) 
0.83 
(0.40) 
Model 
VIII 
R&D 
Performance in 
2009 
 
17 52 69 0.73*** 
(8.38) 
0.43*** 
(3.96) 
0.41*** 
(3.55) 
Model IX R&D 
Expenditure in 
2009 
 
17 55 72 609,597** 
(2.47) 
270,388 
(0.48) 
446,644+ 
(1.33) 
Note: significant at ***0.1%, **1%, *5%, and +10%; numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
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Table 6.6.2 Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) Estimates: External Capital and Other 
Outcome Variables 
 
Models Outcome 
Variable 
Treated 
Subsample  
Matched 
Untreated 
Subsample  
Total 
Sample 
Size 
Treatment Effect Estimate 
Naïve 
Estimator 
PSM 
Estimator 
Regression 
within 
Common 
Support 
Model X Employment 
Size in 2009 
18 53 71  5.36*  
(1.94)  
7.28**  
(3.04)  
6.09***  
(3.69)  
Model XI External 
Capital from 
Banks and Non-
bank financial 
institutions 
17 53 70 0.10* 
(1.72) 
0.12 
(1.27) 
0.08 
(1.02) 
Model 
XII 
External 
Capital from 
All Sources 
11 34 45 0.05 
(0.55) 
-0.05 
(-0.43) 
-0.12 
(-1.04) 
Model 
XIII 
Sales in 2009 18 54 72 -0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.14 
(1.23) 
0.09 
(1.24) 
Model 
XIV 
International 
Sales in 2009 
14 45 59 0.36** 
(3.88) 
0.11 
(0.67) 
0.06 
(0.40) 
Model 
XV 
Profit in 2009 17 52 69 -0.08 
(-0.67) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
Note: significant at ***0.1%, **1%, *5%, and +10%; numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
Figure 6.1 Additionality Effect of the SBIR Program  
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I also examined the propensity of small business start-ups to license-in external 
patents and to license-out their own patents in 2009.  The treatment effect estimate 
without matching is an 9 percentage point advantage of treated small business start-ups in 
licensing-out their own patents to other firms, but is not statistically significant (p<0.50).   
After balancing the confounders, the estimated average treatment effect on the treated is 
substantially higher at 19 percentage points and is now statistically significant at the 5 
percent level.  A very interesting finding is that SBIR recipients are more likely to 
license-in external patents.  After balancing the data, the treatment effect of SBIR 
financing on the probability of licensing-out own patents is 22 percentage points, which 
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The point estimate of OLS is lower at 16 
percentage points but still significant at the 5 percent level due to lower estimated 
standard error than that obtained from the difference in group means after propensity 
score matching.   
The naïve estimator put the post-treatment employment size advantage of SBIR 
recipients at 5.4 employees (p<0.05).  However, when observable characteristics were 
balanced through propensity score matching, the firm size advantage of SBIR-backed 
start-ups grew to 7.3 employees (p<0.01).  On average, the treated subsample had 9.4 
employees in 2009 while non-recipients had only 2.2 employees.  Least squares 
regression analysis within common support estimates the size advantage of SBIR 
recipients at 6.1 employees (p<0.01), which is very close to the PSM estimate.  In Table 
6.5 on page 88, the treated and the matched untreated start-ups, by force of statistical 
matching, started on an equal footing in employment size.  Both started at about one 
employee in 2004 (p<0.50).  But after five years, SBIR recipients grew to about nine 
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employees or more than an eight-fold increase.  On the other hand, their observationally 
similar counterparts only managed to grow from about one employee in 2004 to about 
two employees in 2009, or only a two-fold increase.   
Contrary to expectations, the treatment effect estimates of SBIR financing on 
attracting capital are not statistically significant.  SBIR-financed small business start-ups 
are about 12 percentage points more likely to obtain additional capital from banks, 
government agencies, and other non-bank financial institutions, but such an advantage is 
not statistically significant (p<0.25).  Moreover, the sample data shows that SBIR 
recipient are even slightly less likely than observationally-similar non-recipient start-ups 
to obtain capital from all external sources including family, friends, and other 
individuals
34
 (p<0.80).  When all sources of external capital are taken into account (i.e. 
loans from family, friends, other individuals, government agencies, banks, and non-bank 
financial institutions), there is almost no difference in the ability of treated and untreated 
small business start-ups to attract external capital (p<0.60).   
Does the effect of SBIR on R&D performance persist one year after the treatment 
period?  SBIR recipients are 41 or 43 percentage points (OL and PSM estimates 
respectively) more likely to engage in R&D in 2009 than their observationally-similar 
non-recipient counterparts (p<0.0001).   On average, SBIR-financed small business start-
ups also outspent their non-recipient counterparts by $446,644 (OLS estimate) but such 
an R&D expenditure advantage is only marginally significant at the 10 percent level due 
to a smaller sample size and by extension, larger standard errors.   
                                                 
 
 
34
 Other individuals include business angels.   
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6.4       Discussion 
Without controlling for variables that covary with both SBIR selection and post-
treatment performance, SBIR recipient and non-recipient small business start-ups 
significantly differ in relevant outcome variables.  SBIR grantees are more likely to 
perform R&D (p<0.001), introduce product and/or process innovations (p<0.001), 
license-in external patents (p<0.001), obtain external capital from government agencies 
(p<0.001), and borrow from banks and non-bank financial institutions (p<0.10) after 
receiving the R&D subsidy.  Publicly-funded start-ups also spend more in R&D 
(p<0.001), had more patents (p<0.01), and hired more employees (p<0.05). 
To make the conditional independence assumption (CIA) or ignorability of 
treatment assignment assumption plausible in this observational or non-experimental 
study
35
, we balanced the covariates that we think affect both treatment selection and post-
treatment outcomes.  We constructed a comparison sample that includes non-recipient 
start-ups that are observationally similar to SBIR recipient start-ups by matching on their 
propensity scores.  Consistent with the propensity score theorem (Pearl, 2009), SBIR 
recipient and non-recipient start-ups that have almost identical propensity scores are, on 
average, have the same covariate distribution.  After propensity score matching, the 
matched comparison group and the treatment group are not significantly different in 
terms of firm size, human capital, technological capacity, industrial classification, and 
geographical location.  It is as if this select group of start-ups had been randomly 
                                                 
 
 
35
 For a detailed discussion of the ignorability of treatment assignment, see Chapter 3.   
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assigned to either the treatment or comparison group
36
, making the assumption that 
treatment assignment is ignorable or independent of outcomes plausible.  In this synthetic 
sample of treated and matched untreated start-ups, firm size, human capital, technological 
capacity, industrial classification, and geographical location do not predict SBIR 
selection.  Neither group had an advantage in terms of the number of employees 
(p<0.90), the education (p<0.30) and industry experience (p<0.40) of the 
owners/entrepreneurs, prior R&D experience (p<0.60), number of patents (p<0.995), 
sales (p<0.60), industrial classification (at least p<0.40), and geographical location 
(p<0.95). 
Because the CIA or ignorability of treatment assignment holds, the observed 
outcome of the untreated group can serve as empirical proxy for the unobserved outcome 
of the treated group.  We then estimated the ATT as the difference in post-treatment 
outcomes of the treated and matched comparison subsamples.   
The certification hypothesis is not supported by the data.  We predicted that SBIR 
recipients would use their SBIR awards to signal the viability of their innovation projects 
and their respective companies in order to attract external capital.  SBIR recipients are 8-
12 percentage points more likely to obtain external capital from banks and non-bank 
financial institutions in 2009, but such external capital infusion advantage is not 
statistically significant.  We also found that non-recipient start-ups are equally likely to 
obtain external capital from all sources (including family, friends, and other individuals) 
as SBIR recipient start-ups.  It is possible that SBIR funding obviates the need for 
                                                 
 
 
36
 In experimental studies, random assignment ensures that outcomes are independent of treatment.    
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external capital and/or recipient small business start-ups have not sufficiently expanded 
after five years to warrant external capital infusion.   
There is empirical evidence to support the additionality hypothesis using the KFS-
SBIR data.  SBIR recipient start-ups are 56 percentage points (p<0.001) more likely to 
engage in R&D in 2008 than their observationally similar non-recipient counterparts.  
More specifically, SBIR grantees, on average, spent $663,379 in R&D in 2008 while 
matched non-grantees spent only $185,479.  Assuming the mean independence 
assumption
37
 (Heckman, 1998), SBIR recipient start-ups would have spent only $185,479 
in R&D had they not applied for and obtained subsidy from the SBIR program.  The 
extra $477,900
38
 (p<0.05) can be construed as the input additionality effect of the SBIR 
program.  The SBIR program raised the R&D effort of recipient start-ups from $185,479 
to $663,379.  The expectation is better R&D is being conducted at a higher R&D effort of 
$663,379.  Economies of scale support this conclusion.  While R&D outputs are not a 
monotonic function of R&D inputs, an R&D effort of $663,379 most likely would have 
satisfied Metcalfe’s (1995) critical minimum level of R&D effort necessary to produce 
desired innovation outputs.   
There is also indication of the output additionality of the SBIR.  Grantees are at 
least 33 percentage points (p<0.05) more likely to introduce product and/or process 
innovations in 2009.  Interestingly, SBIR recipients are about 20 percentage points 
(p<0.05) more likely to purchase a license to use external patents.  This could be 
                                                 
 
 
37
 The mean independence assumption only assumes that the untreated outcomes are the same across 
treatment states, that is, E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=1, Xi) = E(Yi0 ׀ Ti=0, Xi) = E(Yi0 ׀ Xi).  See Chapter 3.    
38
 The OLS estimate within common support is $442,412 (p<0.05). 
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evidence of the orchestration activities of enterprises to produce innovation and gain a 
unique competitive advantage.  Due to the complexity of the innovation process, the 
possession of one or two patents may not be sufficient to produce an innovation that will 
enjoy robust consumer demand.  To produce a good or service with high value-added 
(from the consumer’s perspective), the firm may have to combine its own internal 
knowledge assets with that of external parties: other firms, government laboratories, 
universities, or individuals.  Purchasing a license to use an external patent is a mechanism 
to outsource complementary assets (Teece, 2009) through open innovation (Chesbrough, 
2003).   
From Table 6.6.1 on page 91 and Figure 6.1 on page 92, we established that SBIR 
recipient start-ups would have spent only $185,469 in R&D in 2008 had they not 
received SBIR program funds.  This empirical result prompts the question, what was the 
actual private R&D expenditure of SBIR recipient start-ups in 2008?  On average, SBIR 
recipients had been granted $553,991 in R&D subsidies in 2008.  See Figure 6.2 on page 
99.  Thus, SBIR recipients spent only $109,398 in R&D in addition to what they received 
as SBIR subsidy.  This is interesting because as we discussed earlier assuming mean 
independence, SBIR recipients would have spent $185,479 without the SBIR subsidy, but 
with SBIR, they opted to decrease out-of-pocket R&D expenditure to $109,398, a 
decrease by more than $75,000, on average.  Is this empirical evidence of crowding out?  
It could be.  The infusion of public financing through the SBIR subsidy decreased private 
contribution to R&D.  However, it is entirely plausible that such a decrease in privately-
financed R&D only followed from what the recipient firms thought was their “optimal 
level” of R&D effort for that particular period.  After they secured about $550,000 in 
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SBIR R&D subsidy, they might have thought, correctly or incorrectly, that adding 
$185,000 (instead of $109,000) would not have mattered.  The SBIR subsidy may have 
already satisfied what the firm perceived as the critical minimum level or optimal level of 
R&D that they did not find value in adding more private funds.  This has important 
implications for the design of innovation policies and programs like the SBIR.  
However, we have to acknowledge that it is possible that the crowding-out effect 
of the SBIR program has been overestimated.  The quantification of privately financed 
R&D by SBIR recipient start-ups rests on the untestable assumption that the SBIR R&D 
subsidy of about $554,000,
39
 on average, received in 2008 was spent for R&D in the 
same year.  If SBIR recipients only used a portion of the SBIR subsidy in 2008, then the 
crowding out effect is smaller than what we estimated at about $75,000, on average.  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
39
 The ability of small businesses to secure SBIR funds from multiple agency sources at different phases of 
SBIR funding makes it possible for a small business start-up to receive more than $500,000 in R&D 
subsidy.    
Figure 6.2 Private R&D Expenditure by Treatment Status 
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Finally, the estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the 
SBIR program rests on the assumption that SBIR selection is based on observable 
characteristics.  While we used advances in statistical matching to establish the 
counterfactual outcomes of SBIR recipients, our method does not guarantee that our 
treatment effect estimates are bias free.  As program evaluators, analysts, and policy 
researchers, we have to acknowledge that estimates of observational studies or non-
experimental studies are always susceptible to bias.  In this dissertation, if SBIR selection 
is a function of unobservables (e.g. motivation of the owner-entrepreneur) or other 
observable characteristics that the KFS and SBA datasets did not measure and therefore 
were not controlled for in the selection model, then our estimates may include a bias.  
Our hope is that this bias is small enough so as not to change our qualitative conclusion 
that SBIR positively affects R&D effort, innovation propensity, employment size, and the 
orchestration of internal and external knowledge assets to produce innovation.  We have 
theoretical reasons to believe that this is the case.  For illustration purposes, let us assume 
that SBIR selection is also a function of the quality of the submitted SBIR proposal, 
which is unobserved.  It is reasonable to assume that the distribution of the quality of the 
SBIR proposal is the same across treatment status, that is, SBIR recipients and 
observationally similar non-recipients have the same probability of generating quality 
SBIR proposals.  If the treated and matched comparison groups are equally likely to have 
this unobserved characteristic, the omitted variable does not result to unobserved bias.  
SBIR recipient and non-recipients who have the same covariate distribution in firm size, 
education and experience of the owner-entrepreneur, R&D performance, possession of 
external knowledge assets, sales, industrial classification, and geographical location are 
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more likely to have the same probability of producing quality SBIR proposals than 
treated and untreated groups that significantly vary in observable characteristics.  This is 
an untestable but very plausible assumption.   In matching, observations with the same 
distribution of observable characteristics are more likely to have the same distribution of 
unobserved characteristics (Rosenbaum, 2005).             
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND THEORETICAL AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Chapter Seven provides the conclusions and theoretical and policy implications of 
this study as well as recommendations for future research.  The study’s conclusions and 
implications may be relevant to the Small Business Administration, SBIR participating 
agencies, the U.S. Congress, other research and innovation policymakers, and small 
business start-ups.    
This objective of this dissertation is to contribute to expanding our knowledge 
base on the consequences of research and innovation policies and programs.  While we 
agree that these public policies and programs can be construed as technological bets on 
our collective economic future (Borrus & Stowsky, 1999), the payoffs from these bets 
should at least be non-negative.   As of this writing, the Manchester Institute of 
Innovation Research (MIoIR) of the University of Manchester has embarked on putting 
together a compendium of evidence on innovation policy interventions like the 
establishment of science parks to build local innovative clusters, fiscal incentives for 
R&D, public venture capital investment, and innovation procurement programs.  This 
dissertation could be seen as part of this larger effort to identify more systematically 
which policies that encourage and promote innovation work and which do not, 
specifically by examining in more depth the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program.      
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This dissertation advances the literature on federal technology policies in general 
and the SBIR program in particular in at least three ways.  First, unlike R&D subsidy 
studies that focused almost exclusively on EU countries primarily due to the availability 
of national and regional innovation surveys, this dissertation focused on small business 
start-ups in the United States using a new scientific survey of new firms.  It examined the 
effect of a federal R&D subsidy program on the innovation effort and other metrics of 
post-entry performance of start-up enterprises.  Second, unlike SBIR studies that used 
only recipient firms in their empirical analyses, this dissertation built a new dataset, or 
more precisely, integrated two new datasets that ultimately included both recipient and 
non-recipient small firms.  SBIR studies whose samples did not include non-recipient 
firms cannot establish the counterfactual outcomes of SBIR recipients had they not 
applied for and granted R&D funds.  In the counterfactual approach to causal inference, 
the determination that program X causes outcome Y requires that (1) outcome Y was 
produced in the presence of program X, and (2) outcome Y was not produced in the 
absence of program X.  Both conditions must be established empirically before one can 
attribute post-program outcomes to the implementation of the program.  Using only SBIR 
recipients does not completely satisfy the second condition.  In reflexive studies, pre-
program outcomes of recipients cannot serve as their valid and unbiased counterfactual 
outcomes had they not received the R&D subsidy.  This dissertation, as far as we know, 
is the first effort to establish the counterfactual outcomes of small business start-ups that 
received SBIR R&D grants.  It attempted to achieve this objective in a two-step process:             
(1) datasets integration, and (2) statistical matching.  We requested the Kauffman 
Foundation permission to use the confidential version of the Kauffman Firm Survey 
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dataset that is available in the NORC data enclave.  We also requested the SBA to 
provide us a SBIR recipient dataset and the Mathematica Policy Research to integrate the 
same with the KFS.  The integrated KFS-SBA dataset, which identified small business 
start-ups that received SBIR funding, and at the same time, contained thousands of small 
firms that could serve as potential controls for SBIR recipients allowed us to empirically 
construct the counterfactual outcomes of SBIR recipients.  Third, unlike SBIR studies 
that manually and artificially combined recipient and non-recipient small firms, this 
dissertation’s sample of treated and untreated small business start-ups was drawn from 
the same probability sample of new enterprises.  Thus, the two groups of small firms 
came from the same or identical distribution.  In addition, this study used advances in 
statistical matching to achieve better comparability between the two groups of small 
business start-ups.        
For program evaluators who lack experimental data, achieving comparability 
between treated and control groups, which is a key requirement before one can make 
meaningful causal inferences, can be implemented through statistical matching, 
specifically in this dissertation, matching on the propensity score.  If it can be shown that 
program selection is a function of observable characteristics and that these covariates are 
balanced after PSM, then it could be argued that selection bias is controlled for or at least 
minimized when estimating the causal effect of a policy, program, or project.  Estimates 
from non-experimental methods (like PSM) can be offered as tentative estimates of the 
treatment effect of a policy or program until they are confirmed or refuted by more 
rigorous evaluation methods like an experimental research design or a regression 
discontinuity design.     
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This dissertation has shown that small business start-ups that received SBIR R&D 
grants are significantly different from the typical start-up that did not apply and/or 
selected for SBIR funding.  The entrepreneur-owners of SBIR recipients have more 
advanced academic training and longer industry experience than the average or typical 
entrepreneur.  Moreover, SBIR recipient-firms have a higher propensity to perform R&D 
and are more likely to own intellectual property at the start of their business operations in 
2004.  In short, small business start-ups that eventually received SBIR grants started at a 
higher technological trajectory than did the typical start-up, an empirical finding that 
fundamentally proceeded from the fact that most SBIR recipients in the KFS-SBA 
sample competes or operates in the pharmaceutical, chemicals, machinery, electronics, 
electrical equipment, medical and surgical equipment, and R&D and engineering  
industries.   However, recipients do not have size and locational advantages over typical 
start-ups:  recipient and non-recipient start-ups started their operations, on average, with 
close to two employees and are also equally likely to locate their businesses in R&D 
intensive states like California and Massachusetts.  SBIR grantees, though, were less 
likely to generate sales at their first year of operations than their non-recipient 
counterparts. 
All the significantly different baseline attributes between SBIR recipients and 
non-recipients, as expected, figured prominently in SBIR selection.  The odds of 
receiving SBIR grant of a small business start-up whose owner has a post-graduate 
education is more than nine times as high as the odds of a start-up without an owner with 
the same advanced level of academic training.  The odds of being granted SBIR R&D 
subsidies are also higher for those who had prior R&D experience and for those who had 
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patents at the start of their business operations.  Start-ups that are operating in the high-
technology sector (i.e., pharmaceuticals, chemicals, machinery, electronics, electrical 
equipment, and medical/surgical equipment) are also more likely to receive SBIR funds 
than start-ups in the traditional sectors (e.g. agriculture, mining) and the services sector.  
Surprisingly, start-ups that did not sell goods and services are less likely to receive SBIR 
grants.  Interestingly, location matters but at a different direction:  start-ups located in 
states that are not known for their R&D performance are more likely to receive SBIR 
funding.  Firm size did not appear to affect the probability of receiving SBIR award.   
From the determinants of SBIR program selection, we derive the following 
theoretical and policy implications and areas for future research.   
First, prior R&D and innovation record are a market signal on the ability of start-
ups to innovate.  It is not entirely accurate that small business start-ups do not have a 
track record to stand on when applying or competing for scarce public R&D resources 
against established businesses.  Performing R&D right at the start of business operations 
can signal the start-up’s intent to continue performing R&D in the future.  SBIR 
participating agencies judge R&D performers more favorably.  Because learning is 
cumulative, success in producing knowledge assets and innovation in the past underpin 
future innovation performance.  Having patents signals the knowledge and experience the 
firm’s owners have acquired over time.  These patents may have been applied for and 
approved by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) prior to the 
establishment of the firm (e.g. when the owner was still affiliated in a university as a 
graduate student or a faculty member), but just the same, it sends a credible signal that 
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the small business start-up has learned something substantial in the past and is able to 
pursue and produce innovation in the future.   
Second, there is evidence of the distributional function of the SBIR program.  
Start-ups in states that are not known for R&D (e.g. Wyoming, South Dakota, Montana) 
are not less likely than their counterparts in R&D intensive states (e.g. California, 
Michigan, Massachusetts) to receive SBIR funding.  Scholars in political science and 
policy studies may want to study the factors influencing the dispersion of SBIR awards.  
Qualitative studies can probe in more depth the decision of SBIR agencies how to 
distribute SBIR R&D awards geographically.  For example, it is possible that the first n 
percent of SBIR funds goes to the most qualified small businesses and the remaining (1-
n) percent to the not-so-quality technology R&D proposals but were submitted by small 
firms in less R&D intensive states.  These are conjectures and hypotheses that may be 
validated or disconfirmed by follow-up studies.   
Finally, start-ups that do not generate sales may be more likely to receive SBIR 
funding.  This result can be interpreted in at least two ways.  First, those that perform 
R&D are more likely to forego generating sales; their primary intent is to invest in 
knowledge asset production before introducing a new product or service in the market.  
Alternatively, these small firms may have been established primarily for the purpose of 
securing public R&D grants.  They may not have the objective of directly selling goods 
and services themselves; instead, they use firm formation as a mechanism to siphon 
federal R&D resources.  This is a hypothesis that can be further investigated in greater 
depth by follow-up studies.  From a normative standpoint where the production of 
knowledge is a policy goal, it is not necessarily economically inefficient to use public 
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resources to do more R&D, produce knowledge assets out of it, and perhaps in the future 
license these assets out to other firms that may value the R&D outputs (e.g. patents) more 
than the original researcher or inventor.  Using federal R&D resources only for the sole 
purpose of conducting R&D and producing knowledge assets without the clear intent to 
directly commercialize these assets may not necessarily be a weakness in the innovation 
system.  This is a fertile area for future research utilizing the NIS approach.      
After estimating the SBIR program selection model, we employed propensity 
score matching to balance pre-treatment characteristics of SBIR recipients and non-
recipients.  We constructed the comparison sample by identifying non-recipients with 
nearly identical propensity scores as that of SBIR recipients.  Consistent with the 
propensity score theorem (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Pearl, 2009), observations with 
the same distribution of propensity scores have the same distribution of observable 
characteristics.  PSM made the comparison and treatment samples homogenous except in 
SBIR program exposure, making the fundamental assumption of ignorability of treatment 
assignment in causal studies more plausible.  Achieving or at least improving 
homogeneity between groups not only reduces variability of the estimates of treatment 
effects but also their sensitivity to unobserved bias.  We also used parametric models as 
robustness check of the PSM estimates.                                           
Using the realized outcomes of observationally similar non-recipient start-ups as 
the counterfactual outcomes of SBIR recipients had they not received SBIR funds, we 
found empirical evidence of the input additionality effect of the SBIR program.  Had they 
not applied for and granted SBIR R&D subsidies, recipient start-ups would have spent 
only $185,000 in R&D, but with SBIR their R&D effort was significantly increased to 
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$663,000.  The expectation is SBIR recipients are undertaking more risky but higher 
return innovation projects with the R&D subsidy.  The input additionality effect of SBIR 
is consistent with the findings of Aerts and Schmidt (2008), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006), 
Gonzalez and Pazo (2008), and Ozcelik and Taymaz (2007) that R&D subsidy programs 
in Europe, specifically in Germany, Spain, and Turkey, have a positive effect on total 
R&D expenditure and intensity.  Please see Appendix E for a more detailed description 
of the data, methods, and findings of these R&D subsidy and SBIR evaluation studies.      
However, it appears that public co-financing of commercial R&D has crowded-
out privately financed R&D of small business start-ups in the United States.  Without 
SBIR funding, recipient start-ups are expected to spend about $185,000 in R&D, but with 
the R&D subsidy, their privately-financed R&D decreased to $109,000.  A dollar of 
R&D subsidy decreased privately-financed R&D by about $0.16.  This finding calls into 
question the size of SBIR grants and the absence of a requirement for private R&D funds.  
Receiving more than $400,000 of SBIR grants may have decreased the need to shell out 
private funds for R&D.  This problem may have proceeded from the fact that small firms 
can receive grants from multiple agency sources.  SBA may have to reexamine its policy 
regarding multiple agencies (e.g. DOD, NIH, NSF) funding the same technology research 
and the size of the grants.  Requiring recipients to shoulder a certain percentage of the 
R&D project cost may ensure a truly private-public co-financing of early-stage, pre-
competitive technology research.   
That the SBIR subsidy decreased private R&D expenditures runs counter to the 
findings of several R&D studies (Hussinger, 2008; Lee & Cin, 2010; Koga, 2005; and 
Ozcelik & Taymaz, 2008) that public R&D grants induce additional company-funded 
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R&D activities.  Two studies that support this dissertation’s finding on public R&D 
partially substituting for privately financed R&D are Gonzalez and Pazo (2008) who 
found that public funds do not significantly stimulate private R&D expenditures and 
Wallsten (2000) who showed that the size of SBIR grants significantly decreased firm-
financed R&D of small businesses in the U.S.         
This study’s estimate of the crowding-out effect of SBIR on privately-financed 
R&D is smaller than what Wallsten (2000) found using a sample of 81 SBIR recipients 
and non-recipients.  His 3SLS estimate showed that a dollar of SBIR subsidy decreased 
firm-financed R&D by $0.82.  The difference in the magnitude of the crowding-out 
estimates may be due to differences in estimation methods and the populations from 
which the samples were drawn.  This dissertation focused on the effect of SBIR on small 
business start-ups while Wallsten (2000) on the general population of small firms that are 
eligible to apply for SBIR grants.  As shown previously, young and small firms may be 
more innovative than their more established and older counterparts, and thus may be less 
likely to decrease privately-financed R&D with the receipt of the SBIR subsidy than the 
latter.  The hypothesis that the crowding-out effect of public R&D grants is smaller in 
start-up enterprises than in older small firms can be tested in future studies.   
We also found significant output additionality of SBIR.  Recipient start-ups are 
more likely to introduce process and/or product innovations 1 to 2 years after receiving 
R&D subsidy.  This finding is consistent with Berube and Mohnen (2009), who found 
that firms that receive R&D subsidies in Canada are more likely to introduce product 
innovations and generate sizable revenues from them.  Future studies may explore the 
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actual mechanisms through which the SBIR grant directly contributed to the production 
of these innovations.   
 SBIR recipients grew significantly faster than non-recipients in terms of 
employment size at least one year after receiving the R&D subsidy.  This empirical 
finding may indicate that SBIR program funds can help in augmenting scientific and 
technical personnel and possibly, in hiring complementary human resources like 
marketing researchers.     
Contrary to the findings of Lerner (1999) and Toole and Turvey (2009) that the 
SBIR award positively impacts follow-on venture capital financing, we did not observe 
any significant “halo effect” or “certification effect” of receiving an SBIR award on 
attracting external capital, regardless of the source of this external capital.  The SBIR 
subsidy may obviate the need for external private capital.  That is, as internal resources 
for R&D are freed up, SBIR recipients can redeploy these resources for marketing, 
production, and operations.  The new firm may not have grown and expanded enough to 
warrant external capital infusion.  These hypotheses can be further examined in future 
studies on the medium- and long-run certification effects of the SBIR.  Another reason 
why previous studies found a significant certification effect of the SBIR on external 
capital while this study did not is sample size.  For example, Lerner (1999) found that 
SBIR recipients were 1.4 percentage points more likely to attract venture capital 
financing than the matched small firms, and this small effect was statistically significant 
because the study used a large sample of 1,193 small firms.  On the other hand, we found 
that SBIR recipients are 12 percentage points more likely to attract external capital than 
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non-recipients but such outcome advantage is not statistically significant because of a 
larger standard error due to a smaller sample size.      
While we did not find a significant “halo” effect of SBIR on attracting external 
capital, we discovered a different certification effect of the program.   Start-ups that 
received SBIR grants are more likely to attract external patents.  This finding can indicate 
that the SBIR award certifies the quality of the company and the innovation project that 
the recipient is undertaking through the SBIR subsidy.  As such, individuals, government 
laboratories, and companies that own patents may be more willing to license their 
knowledge assets to this group of small firms that they believe will be more successful in 
using their patents to produce innovations.  More successful use of these external patents 
by “certified” SBIR grantees translates to a more steady revenue stream of royalties by 
these patent holders.        
That SBIR grantees are more likely to outsource complementary assets is 
empirical evidence of the orchestration activities for innovation of SBIR recipients.   This 
empirical finding is important for two reasons.  At the firm level, it indicates that 
innovation requires a combination of internal and external knowledge assets.  
Competitive advantage may not lie in knowledge assets produced by private R&D 
investment and/or public R&D subsidy.  It is now increasingly defined by the firm’s 
ability to orchestrate an internal-external portfolio of knowledge assets (Chesbrough, 
2003; Teece, 2009).  It will be very interesting to see future studies examining whether 
start-ups that orchestrated an internal-external portfolio of knowledge assets are indeed 
more innovative and more successful financially.  At the SBIR program level, it is not 
enough to measure R&D inputs and outputs.  It is also critical to look deeper into the 
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orchestration activities of program grantees, that is, how they combine previous 
knowledge assets with new knowledge assets generated through the SBIR funding, and 
how they integrate both old and new internal assets with external knowledge assets to 
produce innovation.  Future evaluations of the SBIR should take into account the 
complexity of the innovation process.  New product prototypes that result from the public 
co-financing of private R&D may not be enough to produce innovations that have high 
customer value added.  The recipient’s ability to procure knowledge externally may be a 
positive effect of the public financing of commercial R&D; the public program may 
strengthen the grantee’s absorptive capacity to use external technologies.  These long-run 
effects will benefit the innovation economy in the long-run, at least from an evolutionary 
economic perspective.   
Our empirical results highlight the importance of looking at innovation policy 
instruments not solely as “correctives to market failures.”   Theoretically and empirically, 
R&D subsidies (which the SBIR program provides) can help recipient-firms satisfy the 
minimum scale of R&D, close the gap between private and socially optimal level of 
R&D, and alleviate the risks and uncertainties of the outcomes of the innovation effort, 
thus correcting market failures in the production of commercially-useful knowledge.  
But, these policy instruments are more than correctives to indivisibilities, positive 
spillover effects, and uncertainties.  More importantly, they are a mechanism to bring 
together the state, the private sector, and the R&D community to identify technological 
challenges, solutions, and breakthroughs together (Whitford & Shrank, 2011).    The 
STTR requirement to small recipient-firms to have a university partner to conduct R&D 
supported by federal R&D grants is a welcome adjustment to the SBIR.   
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Increasingly, the SBIR and other innovation policies and programs should be 
construed as an attempt to apply networks in the governance of the innovation system.  
Relying on hierarchies and the state machinery to identify the technological need and 
solutions of the national economy was discredited a long time ago with the collapse of 
most socialist and communist regimes.  Dependence on the private market is also not 
reliable because the private sector also tends to be myopic: it cannot see all technological 
possibilities and potential breakthroughs using the profit motive lens alone.  It might take 
the concerted effort of the state, the private sector, and the academic/scientific/research 
community to govern the production and distribution of knowledge assets that underpin 
global competitive advantage.  Future evaluations should treat the SBIR program in this 
regard. [R.V.G.]      
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS – BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS 
Variables  Type Definition 
Firm Size  
Number of Employees  
 
Interval 
 
number of employees the start-up had in 
2004 
 
Human Capital  
Post-Graduate Education  
 
 
Industry Experience  
 
Binary 
 
 
Binary 
 
 
coded 1 if the owner/entrepreneur has a 
master’s or doctorate degree, 0 otherwise  
 
coded 1 if the owner/entrepreneur has at 
least 10 years of industry experience, 0 
otherwise 
 
Technological Capacity  
Prior R&D Performance  
 
Number of  Patents  
 
Positive Sales  
 
Binary 
 
Interval  
 
Binary 
 
 
coded 1 if the start-up performed R&D in 
2004, 0 otherwise 
number of patents the start-up owned in 
2004 
coded 1 if the start-up sold goods and 
services in 2004, 0 otherwise 
 
High-Tech Industry 
Pharmaceutical 
 
Chemicals 
 
Machinery 
 
Electronics  
 
Electrical Equipment  
 
Medical/Surgical Equipment 
 
R&D Services  
 
Binary 
 
Binary 
 
Binary 
 
Binary 
 
Binary 
 
Binary 
 
Binary 
 
 
coded 1 if the start-up is a 
pharmaceutical firm, 0 otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up is a chemicals 
firm, 0 otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up is a machinery 
firm, 0 otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up is an electronics 
firm, 0 otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up is an electrical 
equipment firm, 0 otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up is a medical and 
surgical equipment firm, 0 otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up is a R&D and 
engineering services firm, 0 otherwise 
 
Geographical Location  
Location in R&D Intensive 
States (e.g. CA, MA)  
 
Binary 
 
 
coded 1 if the start-up is located in the 
top 25 R&D intensive states, 0 otherwise 
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APPENDIX B 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS – OUTCOMES 
Variables  Type Definition 
R&D and Innovation 
R&D Performance in 2008   
 
R&D Expenditure in 2008 
 
Innovation Propensity in 2009 
 
Licensing-out of Patents in 
2009 
Licensing-in of Patents in 2009 
 
 
Patent Size in 2009 
 
R&D Performance in 2009 
 
R&D Expenditure in 2009 
 
 
Binary 
 
Interval 
 
Binary 
 
Binary 
 
Binary 
 
 
Interval 
 
Binary 
 
Interval 
 
 
coded 1 if the start-up performed R&D in 
2008, 0 otherwise 
amount of total R&D expenditure in 
2008 (in US$) 
coded 1 if the start-up introduced new 
product or process in 2009, 0 otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up licensed out own 
patent in 2009, 0 otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up purchased a 
license to use external patent in 2009, 0 
otherwise 
number of patents that start-up had in 
2009 
coded 1 if the start-up performed R&D in 
2009, 0 otherwise 
amount of total R&D expenditure in 
2009 (in US$) 
External Capital Infusion  
External Capital – Banks and 
Non-bank in 2009 
 
 
External Capital – All Sources 
in 2009  
 
Binary 
 
 
 
Binary 
 
 
coded 1 if the start-up obtained capital 
from a bank or non-bank financial 
institution in 2009, 0 otherwise  
 
coded 1 if the start-up obtained capital 
from a bank or non-bank financial 
institution, government agencies, family, 
friends, and other individuals in 2009, 0 
otherwise 
Employment, Sales, and 
Profit 
Employment Size 2009  
 
Positive Sales in 2009  
 
International Sales in 2009 
 
 
Profit in 2009  
 
 
Interval 
 
Binary 
 
Binary 
 
 
Binary 
 
 
number of employees the start-up had in 
2009 
coded 1 if the start-up sold goods and 
services in 2009, 0 otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up sold goods and 
services in the global market in 2009, 0 
otherwise 
coded 1 if the start-up had a profit in 
2009, 0 otherwise 
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APPENDIX C 
SBA TRANSMITTAL LETTER OF SBIR RECIPIENT DATASET 
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APPENDIX D 
STATA OUTPUTS OF ATT ESTIMATES 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3886 
                                                  LR chi2(14)     =     103.49 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -89.168019                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3672 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       treat | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
c5_num_emp~0 |   .9681393   .0659015    -0.48   0.634     .8472203    1.106316 
post_grad_~0 |   7.326652   4.021197     3.63   0.000     2.498779    21.48243 
work_exp_o~m |   1.243486   .6300084     0.43   0.667     .4606618      3.3566 
f19_res_de~0 |   3.601529   1.820901     2.53   0.011     1.336987    9.701677 
    patent_0 |   1.039199   .0213459     1.87   0.061     .9981926     1.08189 
d6_have_sa~1 |     .31545   .1632708    -2.23   0.026     .1143839    .8699534 
      pharma |   26.50903   28.64539     3.03   0.002     3.188555    220.3909 
   chemicals |    27.2729   28.88152     3.12   0.002     3.422344    217.3396 
   machinery |   15.44698   16.85112     2.51   0.012     1.820823    131.0448 
 electronics |   25.63623   22.25904     3.74   0.000     4.675046    140.5797 
electric_e~p |      20.55   26.12688     2.38   0.017     1.700632     248.321 
medical_eq~p |   186.5064   213.3442     4.57   0.000     19.81558     1755.42 
  RDservices |    3.97611   3.424582     1.60   0.109     .7350677    21.50747 
  top25RD_04 |   .3687238   .2080946    -1.77   0.077     .1219869    1.114523 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
f19a_res_dev_a~4  Unmatched | 691622.632   19531.0647   672091.567     65157.96    10.31 
                        ATT | 663379.444       185479   477900.444   239183.689     2.00 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Sample S.E. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0      2,394 |     2,394  
   Treated |         1         18 |        19  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |         1      2,412 |     2,413  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
   f19_res_dev_4  Unmatched | .894736842   .164315353   .730421489    .08527729     8.57 
                        ATT | .888888889   .333333333   .555555556   .115620308     4.80 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Sample S.E. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0      2,410 |     2,410  
   Treated |         1         18 |        19  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |         1      2,428 |     2,429  
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
c5_num_employe~5  Unmatched | 9.05263158   3.69642857   5.35620301   2.76719271     1.94 
                        ATT | 9.44444444   2.16666667   7.27777778   2.39597022     3.04 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Sample S.E. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0      2,240 |     2,240  
   Treated |         1         18 |        19  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |         1      2,258 |     2,259  
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
did_innovation_5  Unmatched | .631578947   .162790698    .46878825   .085092633     5.51 
                        ATT | .666666667   .333333333   .333333333   .152903988     2.18 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Sample S.E. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0      3,655 |     3,655  
   Treated |         1         18 |        19  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |         1      3,673 |     3,674  
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
d5_a_lic_in_pa~5  Unmatched | .263157895   .015274034   .247883861   .029656548     8.36 
                        ATT | .277777778   .055555556   .222222222   .100969452     2.20 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Sample S.E. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0      2,226 |     2,226  
   Treated |         1         18 |        19  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |         1      2,244 |     2,245  
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APPENDIX E 
SELECTED PRIOR R&D SUBSIDY AND SBIR EVALUATION 
STUDIES 
 
Author Sample/Data Method 
Dependent 
Variable Finding 
Comparison with 
this Dissertation  
Aerts and 
Schmidt 
(2008) 
 
EU CIS III and IV 
 
PSM and 
DID 
 
R&D Expenditure 
R&D Intensity 
 
 
On average, a Flemish 
company that receives a 
subsidy spends 0.837 
million EUR (65%) more 
on R&D, compared to the 
situation where it would 
not have received the 
subsidy. 
German subsidized firms 
spend, on average, 
3.232 million EUR more 
than non-subsidized 
firms.   
 
On average, the R&D 
intensity of German and 
Flemish funded 
companies is 64-100% 
higher than the R&D 
intensity of non-funded 
companies.  Funded 
firms are significantly 
more R&D active than 
non-funded firms. 
 
 
This dissertation 
found that, on 
average, SBIR 
recipient start-ups 
spent about         
$480,000 more in 
R&D than did 
observationally similar 
non-recipient start-
ups.   
 
Both Aerts and 
Schmidt (2008) and 
this dissertation used 
PSM to establish the 
counterfactual 
outcomes of funded 
firms.    
 
Berube and 
Mohnen 
(2009) 
 
Canadian Survey 
of Innovation 
 
PSM 
 
Product 
Innovations 
 
Percent of 
Revenue due to 
Product 
Innovations 
 
Positive Effect 
 
 
This dissertation 
found that SBIR 
recipient start-ups are 
33 percentage points 
more likely to 
introduce product 
and/or process 
innovations than 
observationally similar 
non-recipient start-
ups.  It supports the 
finding of Berube and 
Mohnen (2009) that 
R&D programs can 
have a positive effect 
on product 
innovations.   
   
Czarnitzki 
and Licht 
(2006) 
 
Mannheim 
Innovation Panel 
 
PSM 
 
R&D Expenditure 
 
Innovation 
Expenditure 
 
Patent 
Applications 
 
Positive effect on R&D 
expenditure, innovation 
expenditure, and patent 
applications 
 
 
This dissertation also 
found that SBIR 
recipient start-ups are 
more R&D active than 
observationally similar 
non-recipient start-
ups.   
 
However, we did not 
find a significant effect 
of SBIR subsidy on 
patent size partly due 
to (a) a smaller 
sample size and by 
extension, larger 
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standard errors and 
(b) a shorter time 
frame of the study.   
Czarnitzki and Licht 
(2006) used four 
waves (i.e. 1994, 
1996, 1998, and 
2000) of the 
Mannheim Innovation 
Panel.   
 
Gonzalez and 
Pazo (2007) 
 
Spanish Firm 
Survey 
 
PSM 
 
Total R&D effort 
 
Private R&D Effort 
 
R& D subsidies have a 
positive and significant 
effect on total R&D effort.  
That is, firms add the 
amount of subsidies to 
their private budget, not 
substituting private R&D 
investment by public 
funds 
 
 
Public funds do not 
significantly stimulate 
private expenditures 
 
 
This dissertation also 
found that public R&D 
subsidy from SBIR did 
not substitute for 
private R&D 
investment.  
Specifically, SBIR 
recipient start-ups 
spent about $110,000 
on top of the R&D 
subsidy received from 
SBIR.   
 
Like Gonzalez and 
Pazo (2007), we also 
found that SBIR 
subsidy did not 
stimulate private R&D 
expenditure. In the 
sample, a dollar of 
SBIR subsidy reduced 
private R&D 
expenditure by $0.16.  
 
Both Gonzalez and 
Pazo (2007) and this 
dissertation used PSM 
to establish the 
counterfactual 
outcomes of firms that 
received R&D 
subsidy.   
 
Hussinger 
(2008) 
 
EU CIS 
 
Heckman's 
Selection 
Model 
 
Net R&D 
Expenditure (i.e. 
Total R&D minus 
government R&D 
grant) 
 
New Product 
Sales 
 
R&D subsidy has a 
positive effect on private 
R&D expenditure 
 
Public R&D subsidies 
stimulate additional 
private R&D investment.  
A multiplier effect in the 
sense that EUR1 public 
R&D funding generates 
more than EUR1 private 
R&D expenses.   
 
There is a positive effect 
of publicly stimulated 
R&D investment on new 
product sales 
 
 
Unlike Hussinger 
(2008), this 
dissertation did not 
find a positive effect 
on private R&D 
expenditure.  
Hussinger (2008) 
found a multiplier 
effect of public R&D 
subsidy on private 
R&D investment of 
German 
manufacturing firms 
while this dissertation 
found a crowding-out 
effect of the SBIR 
subsidy.   
 
 
While this dissertation 
found a significant 
positive effect of SBIR 
subsidy on the 
introduction of product 
and process 
innovations, we did 
not observe any 
significant program 
effect on sales 1-2 
years after the 
subsidy.      
 
The difference in 
results could be due 
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to different (a) 
mechanisms in 
selecting German 
manufacturing firms 
and U.S. small firms 
that receive R&D 
subsidy, (b) design of 
the R&D subsidy 
programs between the 
two countries, and (c) 
study time frames.  
Hussinger (2008) 
used a 1992-2000 
panel data of German 
manufacturing firms.   
 
Koga (2005) 
 
Panel Data of 
Japanese high-
technology start-
ups 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
Panel Data 
Analysis 
 
Company-funded 
R&D  
 
The evidence is 
consistent with the 
complement hypothesis, 
i.e., that publicly-funded 
R&D does promote 
private R&D.   
 
 
This dissertation 
found that $1 of SBIR 
subsidy decreased 
private R&D by $0.16.   
The difference in 
results is due to 
different designs of 
the two R&D 
programs, i.e., the 
SBIR program in the 
US and the SRDCT 
program in Japan.  
SRDCT only covers 
up to 50% of total 
R&D expenditures of 
recipient small firms 
while SBIR does not 
require a matching 
R&D expenditure 
counterpart from 
recipient small firms.   
 
Lee and Cin 
(2010) 
 
Panel Data on 
Korean 
Manufacturing 
Firms 
 
2SLS and 2-
step Tobit 
 
Private R&D 
expenditure 
 
Government R&D 
subsidies in Korea 
induce additional 
company-funded R&D 
activities, rather than 
displace private R&D 
investment of the SMEs.   
 
 
This dissertation 
found that the SBIR 
subsidy crowded out 
private R&D 
investment.      
 
The difference in 
empirical results could 
be attributed to design 
differences between 
the Korean R&D 
subsidy program for 
new technology 
development and 
technology transfer 
and the U.S. SBIR 
program.     
 
Lerner (1999) 
 
541 SBIR 
recipients + 891 
matched firms 
 
 
OLS 
Regression 
after 
matching on 
firm size and 
industry 
classification 
and firm size 
and 
geographical 
location 
 
Sales 
 
Employment 
 
Attracting VC 
funding 
 
Positive effect of SBIR 
on sales and 
employment but only in 
areas with substantive 
VC activity 
 
SBIR recipients are 1.4 
percentage points 
(p<0.01) more likely to 
receive VC funding than 
matched non-recipient 
small firms 
 
 
This dissertation 
found that SBIR 
recipients are 14 
percentage points 
more likely to 
generate sales and 11 
percentage points 
more likely to 
generate international 
sales 1-2 years after 
receiving the subsidy 
than their 
observationally similar 
non-recipient 
counterparts, but 
these outcome 
advantages are not 
statistically significant 
due to smaller sample 
size and thus, larger 
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variances of the 
treatment effect 
estimates.  
 
Like Lerner (1999), we 
found a positive effect 
of SBIR on 
employment size. 
 
Unlike Lerner (1999), 
we did not find a 
significant positive 
certification effect of 
SBIR on attracting 
external, regardless of 
the source of external 
capital.  However, we 
found a different form 
of certification effect of 
the program: SBIR 
recipients are more 
likely to outsource 
external knowledge 
assets.  This finding 
implies that the SBIR 
award certifies the 
quality of the 
recipient-company 
improving its ability to 
persuade other 
innovators to license 
out their patents to the 
SBIR grantee. 
 
The difference in 
results could be due 
to differences in 
matching method and 
sample.  This 
dissertation used 
statistical matching to 
balance 14 
observable 
characteristics of 
recipient and non-
recipient start-ups 
before the treatment 
effect of SBIR was 
estimated.  Lerner 
(1999) matched only 
on firm size, industrial 
classification, and 
geographical location.   
    
Ozcelik and 
Taymaz 
(2008) 
 
 
Turkish Annual 
Survey of 
Manufacturing 
Industries  
 
PSM 
 
R&D intensity, 
Own R&D 
Intensity 
 
Positive effect on both 
R&D intensity and own 
R&D intensity 
 
 
This dissertation 
found that the SBIR 
subsidy did not have a 
positive effect on firm-
financed R&D of small 
business start-ups.  
 
R&D subsidy program 
in Turkey provides 
grants that support 
only up to 50 percent 
of total R&D 
expenditure while 
SBIR does not have 
this requirement.  The 
SBIR grant can fund 
up to 100 percent of 
total firm R&D.      
 
Toole and 
Turvey 
(2009) 
 
10,914 SBIR 
grantees 1983-
1999 
 
Probit 
regression 
 
VC capital 
 
 
Size of Phase 1 dollars 
positively affects follow-
on VC investment 
Receiving Phase II 
positively affects follow-
 
This dissertation did 
not find a significant 
positive certification 
effect of SBIR on 
attracting external, 
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on VC investment 
Number of Phase 1 and 
Phase 2 awards 
negatively affects follow-
on VC investment 
 
regardless of the 
source of external 
capital.  What we 
found instead was a 
different form of 
certification effect: 
SBIR recipients are 
more likely to 
outsource external 
knowledge assets.  
This finding implies 
that the SBIR award 
certifies the quality of 
the recipient-company 
improving its ability to 
persuade other 
innovators to license 
out their patents to the 
SBIR grantee. 
 
Toole and Turvey 
(2009) used only 
SBIR grantees in their 
empirical analysis.   
  
Wallsten 
(2000) 
 
 
367 SBIR 
recipients; 90 
rejected firms; 22 
"eligible" firms 
that did not apply 
for SBIR funding.  
Final sample: 81  
 
IV/3SLS 
 
Firm-financed 
R&D 
Employment 
 
 
One SBIR dollar is 
correlated with a 
reduction of $0.82 
(p<0.01) in firm-financed 
R&D 
No effect on employment 
 
 
This dissertation also 
found that the SBIR 
subsidy is associated 
with a reduction of 
privately financed 
R&D.   The difference 
between the two 
studies is in the size 
of the crowding-out 
effect.  Wallsten 
(2000) found that $1 
of SBIR subsidy 
decreased firm-
financed R&D by 
$0.82 while this 
dissertation found a 
smaller crowding-out 
effect of $0.16.  The 
difference could be 
due to the sample 
used by the two 
studies.  This 
dissertation’s sample 
included only start-up 
firms while Wallsten 
(2000) drew a sample 
from the population of 
both young and 
established/older 
small firms.   
 
PSM estimates ATT 
while IV estimates 
LATE.   
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